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PREFACE
This document constitutes one volume of the final report prepared under
Contract NAS9-9046, Space Station Safety Study, which was conducted by the
Aerespace Systems Division, Aerospace Group, The Boeing Company, under the
direction of the Advanced Projects Office, Advanced Missions Program
Offfice, Manned Spacecraft Center, NASA. The objective of the study was to
develop a management tool for evaluating conceptual designs of future
manned space systems from a safety viewpoint. This objective was achieved
through the application of methodical techniques, which are described
where necessary in appropriate volumes of this final report, for analyzing
space station safety problems. This work resulted in the development of
Crew Safety Guidelines which can be used in evaluating future space
station concepts.
In Phase I of the study, the work was directed toward a broad class of
space stations, using several specific configurations as examples, and
considering both crew safety and mission accomplishment as safety goals.
In May 1969, the study was redirected by NASA into Phase II to provide
more direct support to the NASA Phase B Future Space Station Study,
considering only crew safety as the safety goal. To the extent possible,
the work done in Phase I was revised and adapted to Phase II and all
documents of this final report, except as otherwise noted, include the
results from both phases. In both phases the study scope included only
on-orbit operations and not launch, boost, de-orbit, and recovery opera-
tions, or any operations of the logistics support system, except for
close-in rendezvous and docking operations.
The approach taken in the study was to examine the space station from the
viewpoint of safety only, with the intent of identifying as complete a
list as possible of those measures which should be taken to maximize crew
safety. Also, and especially in Phase II, the study dealt primarily with
station concepts, rather than specific designs or hardware items. It was
not possible, and no attempt was made, to examine the impact of safety
measures on other important aspects of space station development, such as
cost, design difficulty, or operational suitability. As station develop-
ment proceeds, trade studies between safety measures and other factors will
be required and management decisions must be made as to the extent to which
other desirable features will be permitted to override safety measures.
The documents constituting the final study report are:
• D2-113070 -4, Condensed Summary Report
• D2-113070 -5, Crew Safety Guidelines, Volumes I and II
c
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• D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses
• Analysis of Operations
• Experiment Program
• Traffic Patterns Analysis
• Human Requirements
• Meteoroid Penetration
• D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram
• D2-113070-10, Fault Tree Analysis
• D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis
Other documents produced during the study but not part of the final
report are:
• D2-113070-1, Detail Study Plan (Phase I only)
• D2-113070-2, Midterm Oral Report
• D2-113070-3, Final Oral Report
• D2-113070-7, Baseline Mission Description (Phase I only)
• D2-113070-8, Baseline System Description (Phase I only)
This document, D2-113070-5, "Crew Safety Guidelines", is published in two
volumes. Volume I. consisting of pages 1 through 186, contains the Intro-
duction, the Crew Sa^ety Guidelines Description, and Crew Safety Guidelines
covering Hazard Groups 1.0 through 8.0. Volume II, consisting of pages 187
;hrough 396, contains Crew Safety Guidelines covering Hazard Groups 9.0
through 12.0, the Cross Indexes, and the References. See the Table of
Contents, page vii, for a further breakdown of Hazard Groups and specific
page numbers.
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ABSTRACT
This document contains the space station Crew Safety Guidelines developed
under Contract NAS9 -9046. The basic arrangement of the guidelines is by
hazard groups, with each guideline appearing only once. Cross-indexes are
provided which relate each guideline to other hazard groups if appropriate,
to subsystems affected by the hazard, to key words, and to damage contain.-
•	 ment and control procedures.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Crew Safety Guidelines developed during the Space Station Safety Study
are presented in this document. Each guideline describes a safety measure
which is suggested as a means of alleviating a particular hazard or group
of hazards and which, if followed, would tend to increase space station
crew safety.
The majority of the effort in the Safety Study was directed essentially toward
two goals. The first was to identify those actions which should be taken to
make a space station as safe as possible. The second was to provide a means
by which management could insure either that the actions had been taken or
that they had been considered and rejected for good and sufficient reasons.
The Crew Safety guidelines presented herein are at the same time a listing
of actions to be taken in the interest of safety and a checklist by which
management can review and assess the extent to which consideration was given
to specific safety improvement. A condition precedent to any use of the
guidelines, however, is the establishment of a strong safety organization.
The Safety Study was oriented solely and strongly to crew safety and this
safety orientation is reflected in the guidelines in several ways. They are
directed generally towards measures to prevent the existence of a hazard, to
preclude the occurrence of an undesired event, or to protect the crew if
something does go wrong, with after the fact remedial actions getting much
less emphasis. They show measures directed against all hazards which were
identified, including already accepted safety measures taken against well-
recognized hazards, and measures proposed against hazards which may carry a
very low risk. Furthermore, in certain instances, they are somewhat con-
tradictory, because a measure which is desirable in the light of one hazard
may not be compatible with a measure desirable in light of another hazard.
The Safety Study, particularly in Phase II, dealt primarily with future space
station/base concepts, rather than with hardware. In consequence the guide-
lines generally are statements of "what" things should be done and not of
"how" they should be done, although suggestions of how to do something are
sometimes made.
The guidelines, then, should be considered as safety suggestions, not commands.
•	 They are statements that point the way toward courses of action which will
enhance crew safety. Their application must be judicious, taking into account
the various trade-offs which are implicit, and sometimes stated, in each one.
Each guideline appears in this document only cnce, listed under a hazard
group which was considered, sometimes arbitrarily, as being most appropriate.
In addition, the guidelines are cross-referenced in several ways which include:
by hazard groups for those guidelines which relate to more than one hazard
group; by the 3ubsystem(s) or functions affected by the guideline; by key-
words; and by guidelines pertinent to damage containment and control.
- 1 -
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2.0 CREW SAFETY GUIDELINES DESCRIPTION
2.1
	
FORMAT AND CONWT
Figure 1 shows the format used in reporting all guidelines. An explana-
tion of the content of each part of the format follows.
2.1.1	 NUMBER
A unique identifying number consisting of an integer and a decimal is
assigned to each guideline. The integer is the number assigned to some
particular hazard group and the decimal is the serial number of the guide-
line within the hazard group.
2.1.2	 Hazard Groups
The 12 hazard groups used in the study, and listed in the following para-
^
aphs, were identified early in the development of the Logic Diagram
document D2-113070-9) as repre sentative of hazard groupings or categori-
zations stated or implied in various literature sources. Subsequent checks
against additional sources or hazard lists show that the list used herein is
in general agreement with others. A difficulty common to all lists, in-
cluding this one, is that there is considerable overlap between hazard
groups, and the assignment of a hazard to a particular group must often
be done arbitrarily. At a later date, if it proves necessary or desirable,
the hazard groups may be broken down into subgroups or other major groups.
2.1.2.1
	
Contamination
This group includes hazards which are related to or caused by contamination
of the spacecraft, including the air, food, and water. The sources of contami-
nation vary and include contaminants produced as by-products of human
metabolism, those produced by the spacecraft through outgassing or other-
wise, and those produced by interreactions among various combinations of
chemicals and/or hardware. In addition, a potential *ad varying source of
contaminants are the materials brought on-board the spacecraft for opera-
tional, scientific, or experimental purposes. In many cases, contaminants
will be present in trace amounts only, but -&n some cases a potential con-
taminant will be on-board the spacecraft in relatively large quantities, with
the possibility of massive contamination.
2.1.292	 Debris and Meteoroid Impact
This group includes collisions with or impact by items external to and not
under any form of control by the spacecraft, such as meteoroids or other
For exauple, the Rand Corporation report on Contingency Pian ring for Space
Flight Emergencies and the Aerospace Corporation report, Manned Space
Flight Emergency Concepts.
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natural bodies, other satellites, spent stages, debris left in space by
•	 other space programs, and the like. The items in this group are generally
those having relatively high energy levels. Not included is impact with
items which form a part of the related equipment of the spacecraft, as
noted in Section 2.1.2.5.
2.1.2.3	 Decompression
This group includes partial or total loss of atmosphere, either in the
entire station or in any one or more separately pressurizable compartments.
2.1.2.4	 Electrical
This group includes injury or fatality to crew members caused by an
electrical current passing through the body, or any portion thereof. It
also includes the effects of electrical arcing, over-currents, or power
failures, and hazards due to static electricity.
2.1.2.5	 Equipment Impact
This group includes crew member impacts with internal station equipment,
supplies, cargo, and the like, whether the impact is caused by motion of
the equipment, by motion of the crew member, or both. It also includes
impacts by station-related equipment external to the station, such as the
logistics support system, free-flying or attached experiment modules or
subsatellites, and vehicles used as space ferries or tugs.
2.1.2.6
	 Explosion
This group includes violent disruption of the station, compartments of the
station, or components within or attached to the station. The disruption
may result from over-pressure, chemical or physical reactions, or other
means.
2.1.2.7	 Illness and Injury
This group includes all mental and physical disabilities of the crew from
any cause. In the case of physical disability, the causes may be physical
injury of any sort or illness of any sort, including illnesses caused by
contamination. It includes illness of laboratory and experimental plants
and animas when such illness may affect the crew. Also included are the
•	 effects, if any, of the weightless or low-gravity environment.
2.1.2.8	 boss of Vital Supplies
This group includes partial or total loss of oxygen, food, or water,
whether caused by failure to resupply, loss of the item, or contamination.
C
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2.1.2.9	 Radiation
Hazards in this group are defined specifically as those which are associ-
ated with any or all of the following: alpha particles, beta particles,
gamma rays, X-rays, cosmic rays, neutrons, high-speed electrons, high-
speed protons, other atomic particles, bremsstrahlung, and any non-ionizing
radiation with established biological safety limits.
2.1.2.10
	
Temperature Extremes
This group includes those hazards associated with the departure of
temperatures from normal, including temperature increases, decreases, or
fluctuations. It also includes extreme heat, such as that generated by
fire, and extreme cold, such as that associated with cryogenics and the
space environment itself.
2.1.2.11	 Spacecraft Accelerations
This group includes hazards associated with all planned or unplanned
motions of the spacecraft, without regard to the cause of or reason for
the motion.
2.1.2.12	 General
Certain hazards either are not clearly associated with any particular group
or appear to be associated with many or all groups and are listed, therefore,
in this general group. Any application of the guidelines which considers one
of the other hazard groups should also consider this general. group.
2.1.3	 GUIDELINE TITLE
The title is a short statement consisting usually of descriptive words which
most accurately represent the subject matter of the guideline.
1	 2.1.4	 APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEM OR FUNCTION
The subsystem or function affected by the guideline is listed. The sub-
systems and functions provide for both normal station operations and
experiment operations. The classifications used in this study are:
• Communications and Data Management (CDM)
• Crew System (CS)
• Electrical Power System (EPS)
• Environmental Control/Life Support System (EC/LSS)
• Stability and Control System (SCS)
• Structures/Mechanical Systems (S/MS)
• Operations (OPS)
• Experiments (EX)
- 6 -
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The basic structure provides the structural shell and support racks for
the subsystems. The subsystems, therefore, consist only of the hardware
needed to perform the subsystems functions. The subsystems shown above are
those required for only the in-orbit phase of an earth-orbit mission and
•	 do not include subsystems specifically required for launch, boost, de-orbit,
and recovery operations. For planetary missions, propulsion systems and
guidance and navigation systems would also have to be considered. Follow-
ing is a brief description of each of the subsystems listed above.
2.1.4.1	 Communications and Data Management
This system provides the data processing and communications capability for
the crew, experiments, and the space station. The communications functions
include transmission of processed engineering and experiment data, voice,
and television to the ground network; receiving command data, voice, and
ranging data from the ground; intercommunication within the space station
and between the space station and EVA personnel, logistics vehicles, and
independent modules; rendezvous and docking communications and ranging
data. For the purposes of this study, it also includes navigation and
guidance functions to the extent that they require inputs from sources
external to the station. Data management is provided by telemetry units,
computer and data adapter, and recorders; to acquire, process, store, and
present the engineering and experiment data for transmission.
2.1.4.2	 Crew System
The crew systems support the crew by providing their requirements for food,
clothing, physical conditioning, personal hygiene, medical examinat- I on and
treatment, portable environmental protection and locomotion (including that
required for extravehicular activity), living facilities and provisions,
recreation, and storage and packing facilities.
2.1.4.3	 Electrical Power System
This system provides the electrical energy required to operate the space
station systems and experiments. These power sources may be one or a
combination of solar panels, batteries, radioisotopes, nuclear, etc. The
system includes power regulation and conversion equipment, a bus system
with appropriate distribution network, and switching and protection devices.
2.1.4.4
	 Environmental Control/Life Support System
This system includes both the life support and environmental control pro-
visions required to sustain the crew and the station equipment for the
duration of the mission. The system basically encompasses the following
functions; atmosphere supply and control, humidity control, CO 2 control,
atmosphere purification (contaminant control), cabin temperature control,
suit loop operations, airlock environmental control, equipment temperature
control, heat rejection to space, water management, and waste management.
C
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2.1.4.5	 Stability and Control System
This system controls the attitude of the space station during the in-
orbit phase of the mission. The system must maintain spacecraft attitudes
or control orientation as necessitated by aerodynamic forces, gravity
gradient, solar pressure, rendezvous and docking operations, experiment
requirements, solar panel orientation, thermal control, and internal dis-
turbances. The categor{es of equipment needed to accomplish these
functions include sensors, computers, controls, displays, and actuators.
For the purposes of this study this system also includes propulsion,
navigation, and guidance functions internal to the station.
2.1.4.6	 Structures/Mechanical Systems
This system classification includes the structural shell, pressure bulk-
heads, internal structure, docking ports and mechanisms, hatches and
mechanisms, airlock structure and mechanisms, logistics or resupply
support equipment, windows, artificial gravity equipment, living quarters
furniture, cabinets, and, in general, other equipment of this classifica-
tion that cannot specifically be included under one of the other sub-
systems.
2.1.4.7	 Operations
This classification is a function and is used to include safety guidelines
pertaining to procedures and activities that are not necessarily hardware-
oriented. At a later date, consideration of the total mission spectrum
may result in considerable expansion and further breakdown of this classi-
fication.
2.1.4.8	 Experiments
The experiments classification has elements of both subsystem and function.
It includes the hardware and operations required to make the observations
and tests other than those required for normal station "housekeeping"
operations. It also may req-aire considerable expansion at a later date.
2.1.5	 SAFETY GUIDELINE
A safety guideline itself consists of a minimum number, preferably one,
of complete sentences which briefly describe a suggested means by which a
hazard may be alleviated or eliminated. They are phrased in conditional
terms, since they are intended to be guides and not requirements.
2.1.6	 REFERENCES
The references associated with a guideline usually refer to a specific,
identifiable segment of one or more of the analyses conducted during the
study and described in other volumes of this report. Additionally, where
appropriate, reference is made to other documentation, which is not a part
- 8 -
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of this report, with the provision that such documentation be authorita-
tive, readily identifiable, and generally available.
2.1.7	 REMARKS
_	 The remarks section includes a brief description of the rationale behind
the guideline. Other guidelines and hazard classifications which are
related to the guideline are cited. Alternate approaches to the problem
are mentioned and the need for trade studies identified.
2.2	 GUIDELINES DERIVATION
The Crew Safety Guidelines were derived through a methodical process in-
volving the following steps. Existing information, especially that per-
taining to safety in manned spacecraft, was reviewed. On the assumption
that future manned space programs would be to some degree analogous to
those of the past, several analytical techniques were employed to project
this information to future concepts. The techniques, which are described
in such detail as is appropriate in other volumes of this report, included
the logic diagram, fault tree analyses, subsystems analysis, and a set of
minor tacks in support of or supplementing the three major techniques.
The hazards associated with future concepts were identified, including
those analogous to past programs and those believed peculiar to future
programs. A means of safeguarding against each identified hazard was
developed and a guideline derived expressing the safeguard. In some cases
safeguard development and guideline derivation were a single step. Over
500 guidelines were derived initially, this number being reduced to 282 in
the final reviews. The final steps, conducted simultaneously, were a
review and consolidation of guidelines to combine several like or similar
guidelines into one and a feasibility evaluation to ascertain if and how
a guideline could be practically employed. During these final steps,
also, some cf the original guidelines were discarded because they did not,
in fact, provide safeguards against the hazard identified.
2.3	 GUIDELINES APPLICATION
In considering how best to apply the guidelines, two extremes suggest
themselves. One way would be to use the guidelines as a checklist against
a final design. The other way would be to use them to derive certain
station or base concepts which would be optimized with respect to crew
safety. There are, of course, applications which lie somewhere between
these two extremes. In any case, the guidelines do provide a basis for a
strong and viable safety program. Establishment of such a program, however,
will require the existence of a strong safety organization, responsible to
top management for planning, directing and controlling the space station
base safety program.
2.3.1	 REVIEW OF FINAL DESIGN
Application of the guidelines as a checklist for review and evaluation of
the safety aspects of a final desiga will serve a useful purpose. It will
reveal, on an item-by-item basis, the extent to which the guidelines have
-9-
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actually been applied. Cases of non-application will raise questions of
whether the guideline had been, in fact, considered but rejected for good
reasons or whether design changes should be made to apply the guideline.
If the latter is the case, however, it may prove difficult in some cases
to innorporate desired design changes. The guidelines have aspects of
indicating design details, of establishing procedures, or of driving the
configuration, and most guidelines have all three aspects. Design details
and procedural matters often may be incorporated at a relatively late
date, but configuration drivers are best incorporated at the earliest
possible time.
2.3.2	 CONCEPT DERIVATION
A very useful application of the guidelines is to derive station or base
concepts in which safety is the primary consideration. These concepts can
then be used as a safety baseline against which other necessary and desir-
able factors can be weighed. The following discussion will demonstrate
how this can be done. It will also serve to illustrate certain limitations
to the guidelines, including compromises which must be made between oppos-
ing safety guidelines.
2.3.2.1
	 Definition and Ground Rule
No existing definition of the term "guideline" was found which was appro-
priate to the intent of the study, so the following definition was devel-
oped:
A guideline is a statement which points the way toward a course of
action.
In the case of the guidelines presented herein, it follows that the course
of action, if pursued, will add some increment of safety to the space
station or base.
In the early stages of the study, the attempt was made to draw inferences
and make statements about the zero-gravity space station and later on
transfer them to the artificial-gravity space base. As the study progressed
it began to appear that this approach, while producing some results, was
not as effective as the reverse, namely, to consider first the space base
and transfer to the station. The ground rule was established and should
be kept in mind in the following, that statements made are equally applic-
able to the space station and the space base unless specifically indicated
otherwise.
2.3.2.2	 Traffic/Work Flow Guidelines
The arrangements for traffic flow, for work flow, and work stations are
important configuration drivers. Furthermore, they represent problems of
the future space base which are a major change from present programs. For
these reasons they were selected for the starting point in concept develop-
ment, although some other set of guidelines might also be used.
- 10 -
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Typical guidelines dealing with these subjects are:
7.7	 Design of rotating spacecraft should be such that the direction
of major traffic flow is parallel to the vehicle spin axis.
•	 7.19 Design of rotating spacecraft should be such that radial traf-
fic is kept to a minimum.
•	 7.23 Crew living and working stations should be oriented such that,
during normal activity, the lateral axis through the crew member's
ears is parallel to the axis of spin. In conjunction with this guide-
line, the work console instruments and controls should be designed so
that left-right head rotations and up-down arm motions are minimized.
Considering only these guidelines, a concept such as presented in Figure 2
is developed. Making the base long and slender forces major traffic flow
in the direction of the axis of rotation. A single deck minimizes radial
traffic flow. The work stations are located with the crew member facing
the direction of rotation (or away from the direction of rotation, with
the work station arrangements as shown in the detail. The base rotates
in the -Y direction about a central non-rotating hub, not shown, in the Z'
axis and with appropriate counter-weights, e.g., the nuclear-fueled elec-
trical power supply in the +X direction.
Without further elaboration on the point, such a configure tion probably
would be impractical in the light of factors other than safety. It should
be recognized, therefore, that a series of trade studies, at least on an
informal basis, will ultimately be required in which other factors are
weighed against the safety increment of each guideline. In addition..
however, this configuration does not incorporate certain other desirable
safety features, as will be further discussed, and leads to the need for
a second set of trade studies in which compromises between desirable safety
features must be made.
2.3.2.3	 Compartmentation
A number of guidelines deal with the compartmentation of the base, and
matters related to compartmentation, two of which are:
12.13 The space station/base areas inhabited by the crew should
consist of two or more independently pressurizable compartments with
more than one exit from each compartment.
12.30 Each compartment should have a minimum of two escape routes,
which should not terminate in a common compartment.
Together, these guidelines dictate that the space station base should have
a minimum of three compartments with access between each pair, as illus-
trated in the schematic diagram of Figure 3. The long, slender station
- 11 -
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shown in Figure 2, while it might be established with three compartments,
is not readily adaptable to the idea of escape routes which do not termi-
nate in a common cumpartment. The need for some compromise between traffic
flow requirements and compartmentation is shown in Figure 4. Mere a
triple-tier arrangement is used, having three single-deck compartments.
As before, it rotates in the -Y direction, the X-axis being the radius with
•	 non-rotating hub and counterweights not shown. (While no attempt has been
made to establish sizes or dimensions of these concepts, it is interesting
to note that the concept shown in Figure 4 could accommodate three compart-
ments approximately 14 feet in diameter within an envelope 33 feet in
diameter, shown by the doted circle.) Note that a compromise in traffic
flow is required in which axial traffic would be reduced to some extent
while radial and tangential traffic is increased. Furthermore, as before,
there may be some elements of impracticality in this concept and certain
desirable safety features are still not included.
2.3.2.4	 Crew Distribution
In the interest of exposing the least possible number of crew members to
hazards, a guideline states:
12.18 The number of crew members in any compartment at one time
should be held to the minimum necessary to perform the required
function.
_	 Compliance with this guideline may be difficult, however; or, at least, the
minimum number" may prove to be rather large. The Traffic Pattern Analy-
sis presented in D2-113070 -6
 showed that crew members spend about two-
thirds of their time, and, hence, tend to congregate, in those areas of the
station/base which are devoted to crew health and well-being. Figure 5
illustrates this for the 12-man space station, but the finding is equally
valid for all other configurations examined. Note that there is extensive
use of those areas intended for sleepingy eating, and personal hygiene.
By contrast, Decks 1, 2 and 3 of the 12-man station had no areas with more
than 10 men-hours per day utilization.
This situation led to the following guideline:
12.20 The areas in which crew members spend the majority of their
time, e.g., staterooms, dining facilities, personal hygiene, exercise,
and recreation areas, should be located and designed to be the safest
parts of the station.
A crew area location concept which would implement this guideline is shown
in Figure 6, in which the crew area is shown by the shaded area located
centrally in the station. The area would be separately pressurizable from
the rest of the station.
C
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2.3.2.5	 Redundancy Concepts
Not surprisingly, a great many guidelines require some sort of redundancy.
Typical of these is the following:
	
8.9	 A space station should include at least two independent ECASS's
located in separate compartments. These systems should be capable of
supplying the atmospheric requirements even with one system inoperative.
Similar guidelines require redundancy in food, air, and water supplies; in
electrical power and distribution equipment; in hatches and docking mecha-
nisms, and so on. Usually, the guideline also specifies that either one of
the redundant systems should be capable of meeting the total station/base
requirements. The net result of the redundancy requirements is that the
station concept begins to approach that of two interconnected and mutually
supporting stations.
	
2.3.2.6	 Station/Base Concepts
The station/base concept shown in Figure 7 embodies the safety features which
have been discussed in the foregoing. It is essentially a Siamese twin,
consisting of two identical, or nearly identical, halves connected together
by the central pressure bulkhead in which hatches provide access between
halves. As a rotating base, two elevator shafts would connect it to and
provide access to the central non-rotating hub and the nuclear electrical
power supplies on the opposite side of the hub. All systems, supplies, etc.,
essential to crew safety would be duplicated in each half as far as function
is concerned, but the operating principles of the two members in each pair
should be different whenever possible. In any case, either one of each pair
would be capable of meeting crew safety needs of the entire station. The
crew area is double-decked and centrally located. It is surrounded by a
pressure wall with the end bulkheads, as well as the central bulkhead, being
pressure bulkheads. The exterior walls and bulkheads of the entire station
are pressure structures, thereby dividing the station into six compartments.
Major traffic flow is in the axial direction with tangential and radial
traffic mir,mized and with an elevator as the normal means of radial move-
ment_
The process of applying the guidelines to this concept can be continued
and would undoubtedly indicate further compromises. For example, the follow-
ing guideline states:
	
3.9	 Provision should be made for an airlock in the hatch or hatchway
between s_parately pressurizable compartments.
Since the intent of this guideline is to permit access to a depressurized
compartment without having to depressurize the entire station, it becomes
most important when the number of compartments is small. As the namber of
compartments increases it may be that an acceptable compromise, at least
in emergencies, would be to use an entire compartment ad %cent to the de-
presEurized one as the air:Lock.
- 18 -
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2.3.2.7	 Cargo Restraint Concepts	 D
One further example of guideline application will be given involving the
problems of restraining and moving cargo. Two typical guidelines state:
5.1	 All bulk cargo should be properly tethered or otherwise zon-
trolled during zero-gravity or reduced-gravity operations.
".10 Adequa,e restraints, tethers, or aids t3 assist the crew in
personal movements and handling large-mass equipment should be avail-
able throughout the interior and exterior of the space station.
With respect to cargo, these guidelines imply that a means should be provided
to prevent undesired motion either in translation or rotation, with respect
to all three axes. Figure 9 presents a concept which does this and shows
cargo being transferred by elevator between the non-rotating hub and the
artificial-gravity portions of the base. The cargo is tied-down to a pallet
or dolly. The dolly is mounted on sets of dual wheels which operate in slot-
ted tracks in the station decks. A suitable braking system is provided on
the dual wheels, for example, by extending the wheels against the sides of
the slots. The elevator operates through a rack and pinion arrangement.
This concept provides the required restraint against undesired motion in all
parts of the base, including zero gravity and artificial gravity. However,
the question arises as to how to transition across the interface between the
rotating and non-rotating portions of the station.
A concept for performing this transition is illustrated in Figure 9, which
shows the interface between the non-rotating sections, at right and left,
and the rotating section with portions of the elevator shafts in the center.
A transfer cage is positioned across the interfaces and held in position
laterally by travelers in slots in the bulkheads, but free to rotate. A
transfer platform with slotted tracks is mounted in the cage. A set of
clutches permits the cage to be locked to and aligned with either the rotating
or non-rotating sections. Assume that cargo is to be transferred from the
non-rotating to the rotating section. Clutch set A is engaged and the trans-
fer platform aligned with the station deck. The cargo, tied down to the dolly,
is roiled from the deck to the transfer platform. Clutch set A is released
and clutch set B engaged, causing the cage to rotate, with the operation done
so as to align the transfer platform with the elevator platform. the dolly,
with cargo, is rolled onto the elevator platform and transported by elevator
to its destination. For simplicity, necessary safe+f features such as inter-
locks and guards are not shown.
	
2.3.2.8
	 Comments
The foregoing brief discussion has illustrated the following:
	
a.	 A method of applying the guidelines to develop station/base
concepts in which crew safety is the primary consideration.
- 20 -
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b. The need for compromise (and by implication for a second set of
trade studies) between guidelines which specify safety features which
are not compatible with each other.
C.	 A requirement for trade studies in which the safety features
incorporated in a guideline or set of related guidelines are compared
with and evaluated against other factors.
d.	 That application of the guidelines is feasible, at least in the
sense that a concept can be developed which incorporates the safety
features required by the guidelines.
P,RECEDING PAGE BLANK_NOTA
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3.0	 CREW SAFETY GUIDELINES
This section contains the complete set of guidelines, arranged alphabetically
by hazard groups.	 The guidelines are filed as follows:
In Volume I
3.1 Contamination -- Nos. 1.1 through 1.32
3.2 Debris and Meteoroid Impact -- Nos. 2.1 through 2.4
3.3 Decompression/Overpressure -- Nos. 3.1 through 3.25
3.4 Electrical -- Nos. 4.1 through 4.14
3.5 Equipment Impact -- Nos. 5.1 through 5.12
3.6 Explosion -- Nos. 6.1 through 6.13
3.7 Illness and Injury -- Nos. 7.1 through 7.23
3.8 Loss of Vital Supplies -- Nos. 8.1 through 8.33
In Volume II
3.9 Radiation -- Nos. 9.1 through 9.21
3.10 Temperature Extremes -- Nos. 10.1 through 10.30
3.11 Spacecraft Accelerations -- Nos. 11.1 through 11.12
3.12 General -- Nos. 12.1 through 12.63
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 FNO • I.
TITLE:	 Airflow Cutoff to Enclosed Contamination Sources
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Enclosed air duct systems that include potential sources of atmosphere contamina-
tion should provide sensors immediately downstream of the contamination source,
which, if activated, would shut off the airflow through this equipment and
provide a visual and audible alarm at the command and control center(s).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of atmos-
phere contamination.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 10-D, "The fire warning system is
inadequate at the time required."
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8H, 18D, 44B, 45B and 76J.
REMARKS:
Space station systems air ducts may include equipment that contains material or
particulate matter which is used for filtering or absorbing substances contained
in the air. If failure of this equipment could release quantities of these
materials that could seriously affect the operation of other equipment, or
contaminate the compartment atmosphere, then the system should be designed for
this contingency.
Also applies to the following hazard grcup: 8. Loss of Vital Supplies
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination
	 NO- 1.2
TITLE:
	 Battery Venting
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power (EP)
SAFETY GUIDELINE.
Adequate venting of batteries should be provided to prevent contamination,
over-pressure,or explosion.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of fire, smoke,
toxicity.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8F and 61D.
REMARKS:
Batteries that are not properly vented can ,ecome over-pressurized, e.g., when
inadequate cooling or cooling failure results in increased operating tempera-
tures,and give off toxic gases that could cause crew illness, or electrolyte
leakage that could cause structural corrosion. Extreme cases could result in
battery explosion and possible serious damage to crew members and/or equipment
vital to crew safety.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 3. Decompression/Overpressure
6. Explosion
0
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 NO • 1.3
TITLE:
	 Contaminant and Waste Products Collection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Vnvironmental Control/Life Support System
(ECASS)
SAFE TY GUIDELINE:
All filters, screens, or other devices used to collect contaminants or waste
products should be designed so they can be easily serviced or replaced without
releasing contaminants into the atmosphere.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of atmosphere
contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions LOG, 32B, 60E and 61E.
REMARKS:
Equipment used to collect contaminants or waste products during long-duration
missions will require servicing and/or replacement of the collection device
when its capacity has been exhausted. Equipment design and associated
maintenan,-e procedures must be such as to prevent release of the collected
contaminants or waste products into the atmosphere when the collection devise
is replaced. Consideration must also be given to the problem of long-term
storage of removed filters, etc., as entrapped bacteria may grow and present•
a potential health hazard.
-C
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 FO. 1.4
TITLE:	 Contaminant Control Equipment Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Active redundancy should be provided for equipment which is essential to the
control and detection of atmosphere contaminants.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of atmospher
contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 10F.
REMARKS:
Controlling atmosphere contaminants within specified limits is required for
crew safety. To ensure continuous control of contaminants and a continuous
capability for detecting excessive contamination, ac'Uve redundancy should be
provided for equipment that is essential to these functions.
a
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 ENO - 1.5
TITLE:	 Control Procedures for Excessive Contamination
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmenta= ^.ontrol/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Structures/Mechanical (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Procedures should. be established and means provided the crew for controlling
and/or eliminating contamination that is in excess of the EC/LSS capability
to control on a timely basis.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, Appendix 6B, List of Possible
Contaminants.
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysers (EC/LSS), Potential hazard of atmosphere
contamination.
3. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 17-C, "Fire results in overtaxing
(EC/LSS) equipment operation."
4. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8H, 42H and +5B.
REMARKS:
Excessive contamination may occur in several ways, such as accidental spillage
of hazardous materials, by failure of the EC/LSS, or as by-products of fire.
If this situation does occur, the crew should be able to take the necessary
corrective action as expeditiously as possible. Therefore, emergency procedures
should be developed to provide for controlling and/or eliminating the contamina-
tion. For example, the contamination level might be regulated through a
controlled leakage of air that is cow ensated by the addition of 02 to the
atmosphere. If the contamination level cannot be regulated in some manner it
may be necessary to purge the affected compartment by complete evacuation of
the atmosphere.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 3. Decompression/overpressure8. Loss of Vital Supplies
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 [NO- 1.6
TITLE:
	 CO2 Partial Pressure Monitor
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
An audible and visual alarm should be provided to warn the crew of cabin CO2
partial pressure which is not within prescribed limits for crew safety. This
alarm should to provided both in the affected space station compartment and at
the command Qnd control center(s).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of excessive
CO2.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 45B, 48H, 481 and 76J.
REMARKS:
The space station crew should be made aware of out-of-tolerance CO2 partial
pressures in any pressurized compartment which, if allowed to continue, could
affect crew safety. Procedures should be developed for controlling the space
station atmosphere after this warning has been received.
O
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 [NO- 1.7
TITLE:
	 CO2
 Removal Equipment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Redundant CO2 removal equipment with capability of manual override of automatic
operation should be provided to ensure a continuous capability to keep the cabin
Coo partial pressure within allowable limits.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of
excessive CO2.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8H, 1OF and 45B.
REMARKS:
The CO2 partial pressure must not exceed certain limits in any inhabited com-
partment or the safety of the crew will be endangered. To ensure continuous
operation of the CO2 removal function, even if there is an equipment failure,
redundant CO2 removal equipment should be provided. In addition, situations
may arise where automatic control of the CO2 removal function is inoperative
and it would be advantageous to have the capability to manually control the CO2
removal equipment until automatic control can be re-established.
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 [NO, 1.8
TITLE:
	 Equipment Contamination by Propellants
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS),
Electrical Power System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Equipment, including electrical wiring, that could become contaminated or
damaged by leaking propellants should be located to preclude coming in contact
with possible leakage or should be provided suitable protection.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of propellant
leakage.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 9C and 328.
REMARKS:
Propellant systems are susceptible to leakage from the equipment and the
numerous plumb-ng connections throughout the system. Depending on the type
used, propellant leakage may have a detrimental effect on wiring or other
equipment. This possibility should be considered when determining the location
of those items. If a satisfactory location away from possible propellant
leakage cannot be found, then the wiring or equipment should be shielded to
ensure protection against leakage.
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 NO. 1.9
TITLE:
	 Fluid/Debris Collection and/or Containment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Crew System, Stability and Control System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Means should be provided for collecting and/or containing any loose fluids or
debris that might result during the replacement of system components.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 32B, 60D, 61D and 65D.
REMARKS:
Other guidelines suggest use of minimum loss fluid connectors and designing
contaminant or waste collection devices so they can be replaced without releas-
ing contaminants into the cabin atmosphere. Despite these precautions there
still will be the possibility of fluids or debris being inadvertently released
during maintenance or by faulty equipment operation. Therefore, some means
should be provided for containing these materials during maintenance and/or
collecting materials lost during maintenance or equipment operations.
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 NO, 1.10
TITL!::	 Fluid Leak Isolation
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Stability and Control
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Fluid systems should have provisions for shutting off the flow of fluid to
sections of the system or equipment which are susceptible to damage or leakage.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 6B and 61D.
REMARKS:
Fluid leakage can be a hazard to crew safety through contamination of the
breathable atmosphere, it can be detrimental to the operation of system equip-
ment, and it can create the possibility of fire or explosion. To minimize any
leakage which might occur, provisions should be included in the system for
shutting off the fluid supply to possible leakage points.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
0
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 NO, 1.11
TITLE: Fluid Lines Contamination
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All orifices, close tolerance valves and contamination-sensitive equipment in
fluid systems, should be adequately protected from contamination. Furthermore,
if the system is either designed for periodic flow reversal, or a possibility
exists that flow reversal could occur, both sides of these items should be pro-
tected.
REFERENCES:
1. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969, Hazard Nos.17,
161 and 171.
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
REMARKS:
Filter design should take into account the increased demand imposed by orbital
operation to remove debris which, under 1-g operation, would naturally separate
out and be retained in sumps.
Crew procedures should direct that extreme caution be exercises if the fluid
line is opened between a device and its protecting filter, to ensure that
additional contamination is not introduced.
c
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination
	 [NO. 1.12
TITLE: Food Storage Containers Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Environmental Control/Life
Support System (EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Food supplies should be stored in more than one storage container or device.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of food
contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 31G and 598.
REMARKS:
Edible food is vital to the life support and, therefore, to the safety of the
crew. To preclude the loss of all food supplies because a failure results
in contamination of the food, the food supplies should be stored in more
than one container. The containers should also be located so they are not
in the proximity of known sources of contamination. They should be further
protected from contamination from outside sources by providing adequate sealing
of the containers.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 7. Illness and Injury
8. Loss of Vital Suppiies
-0
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 NO. 1.13
TITLE: Food Storage Sterilization
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Environmental Control/
Life Support System (EC/ISS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A means for sterilizing containers where food is stored should be provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of food
contamination.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 31G and 59B.
REMARKS:
Preser-,ration of food supplies is vital to the safety of the crew. It will be
a particular problem on space missions wh(sre food must be stored for long
durations. Therefore, it is essential that adequate provisions be provided for
ensuring that food spoilage does not occur. This could be done through proper
food storage sterilization methods.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 7. Illness and Injury
8. Loss of Vital Supplies
- 39 -
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination;	
[
NO. 1.14
TITLE.-	 Food Supplies Refrigeration System Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS) Environmental Control/Life
Support System ^EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Food supplies which require cooling or refrigeration should be protected by
a redundant capability for accomplishing the cooling function.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of food
contamination.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 1OF and 31G.
REMARKS:
Preservation of the food supplies is vital to the safety of the crew. Some
of the food requires cooling or refrigeration to prevent spoilage or contamina-
tion. Since the cooling is a continuous requirement and the food supplies
usually cannot withstand a prolonged loss of the cooling, redundancy should be
provided.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 7. Illness and Injury
8. Loss of Vital Supplies
0
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 NO, 1.15
TITLE:	 Hazardous Materials--Quantities
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, Experiments, Crew System (CS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The amount of toxic cr potentially toxic materials (such as materials or
chcmicals utilized in experiments) on-board the spacecraft should be limited
such that accidental release of the total quantity of the materials will not
produce contamination above the capability of the environmental control system
to remove on a timely basis.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), i5-J, "Fire results in failure
of EC/ILSS," and 17-C, "Fire results in overtaxing (EC/ISS) Equipment
operation."
2. il2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, Appendices 6A, B, C.
REMARKS:
If mission requirements dictate the presence of large amounts of such materials,
consideration should be given to storage in unpressurized or unmanned locations,
bringing into the manned portions of the spacecraft only the minimum amounts for
immediate requirements.
C
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 [NO. 1.16
TITLE:	 Human Tolerance to Atmosphere Contaminants, Long-Term
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/ISS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Threshold Limit Values (TLV's) of contaminants for long-term human exposure
should be established. for spacecraft environments.
REFERENCES:
1. Nuclear Powered Submarine Atmosphere Control (L'), NAVSHIPS 0938-011-4010,
Confidential, Dept. of .;he Navy. Washington, D.C., December, 1967.
2. AFSC Design Handbook, System Safety, AFSCDH 1 -6, Headquarters, AF Systems
Command in cooperation with the NASA, 20 January, 1969.
3. NASA SP-86, Medical Aspects of an Orbiting Research Laboratory, pages 30,34-35•
4. NASA CR-1205(III), Compendium of Human Responses to the Aerospace Environ-
ment, Vol. III, Section 13, 1968.
5. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, "Human Requirements."
REMARKS:
The data on human tolerances to chem i cals are usually related to the normal
work week and are published periodically by the American Conference on Govern-
mental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) as Threshold Limit Values (TLV). These
values represent time-weighted average concentrations below which most individ-
uals may be :ixposed for 8 hours per day, day after day, without adverse effe^ts.
The long-term space missions contemplated create a requirement for tolerance
criteria for both short-term, high-concentration and long-term, law-concentraticn
exposures. Unfortunately, few data are currently available for long-term
exposures and, when available. they demonstrate that IV's should not be
extrapolated.
0
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 [NO- 1.17
TITLE:
	 Insect Control
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Operations, Experiments
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A means of controlling insects in the spacecraft should be provided. The
control method should be harmless to men and equipment.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, "Human Requirements."
2. Candidate Experiment Program for Manned Space Stations, NASA Headquarters,
May 1969.
REMARKS:
The likelihood of insect contamination of a spacecraft appears low but it
could occur through escape of insects on-board for experimental purposes or
thr')ugh resupply and crew rotation operations. Normal control means, such as
fumigation or poisoning, would probably not be acceptable on a spacecraft.
C
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 NO • 1.18
TITLE:	 Materials--Configuration Control
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Strict configuration control procedures should be established over all materials
incorporated in or brought on-board the spacecraft.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, Appendices 6A, B, C.
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/ISS), for potential hazard of atmosphere
contamination.
3. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969, Hazard No. 13.
REMARKS:
Spacecraft operations and the experiment program will unavoidably require that
considerable quantities of hazardous material be on-board the spacecraft. If
the materials are known, equipment and procedures can be established to safe-
guard against hazards but materials not identified coiLld pose unexpected
hazards. Control should extend to materials used in spacecraft manufacture,
such as solvents and cleaning compounds, and to personal possessions of the
crew, such as toilet articles.
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 Fo. 1.19
TITLE:
	 Mercury Metal
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The use of mercury metal on-board space stations should be prohibited.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of atmospher
contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 59B, 59F, 61B and 61??.
REMARKS:
Mercury is commonly used in temperature indicating devices, for testing and
calibrating instruments, as part of different experiments, and in some power
system concepts. Mercury is very toxic and spillage of small quantities could
rapidly endanger crew safety. Mercury will also cause extremely rapid deteriora-
tion and structural failure of aluminum materials. Therefore, mercury should
not be permitted on-board the space station.
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 FO.- 1.20
TITLE:	 Ozone
APPLICABLE SJBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power, Experiments, Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Provision should be made for the removal of ozone generated by X-ray equipment
or electrical arcs.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, Appendix A.
REMARKS:
The Threshold Limit Values for ozone are very low. Therefore, equipment which
might generate ozone should be isolated or ventilated in such a manner that
ozone does not escape into the general spacecraft atmosphere. There is also
a possibility that ozone could be formed through photochemical reaction.
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HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 FO- 1.21
TITLE:
	 plumbing Connectors--Minimum Loss
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Stability and Control System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Connectors used to connect pl,.unbing or components in fluid systems should be
deigned for minimum loss of fluid when disconnected.
REFERENCES:
1. D2
-113070-1 1, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram :
 t.opositions LOG and 61D.
REMARKS:
It is expected that there will be numerous times during a long-duration mission
when it will be necessary to disconnect plumbing in fluid systems during
maintenance and repair activities. To avoid contamination of the crew's
atmosphere this should be done with minimum loss of fluid, particularly if
the fluid is toxic or flammable. Provisions should also be made for collecting
or containing any fluid which might be lost. Even if non-toxic and non-
flammable fluids are used there still is a possibility of leaking fluids
causing damage to equipment which is essential to crew safety.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Contamination NO • 1.22
TITLE:	 Plumbing Connectors--Minimum Quantity
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Stability and Control System, Electrical Power, Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Tae number of connectors used in plumbing and connections of fluid systems
should be kept to a minimum.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 10G.
REMARKS:
Experience has shown that one of the most troublesome aspects of system designs
has been leakage of fluid connectors. In a space station, leakage presents a
problem of atmosphere contamination that could jeopardize crew safety and/or
damage equipment which is essential to crew safety. Therefore, the number of
fluid connectors should 'be kept to a minim wim. One ap proach to minimize fluid
connectors is to use a manifold concept for small valves. The valves would
have permanent housings interconnected by welded or brazed tubes. The movable
part of the valve would be a cartridge type that could be replaced without
disturbing the housing or tubing.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Cor i:amination	 NO. 1.23
TITLE:
	 Toxic or Flammable Fluids
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Stability and Control System, Electrical Power
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Flu.id2 required for the operation of subsystems located in pressurized compart-
ments inhabited by the crew should be non-toxic, non-flammable, and non-
corrosive.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
2. D2-11_'070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 16D and 16H.
REMARKS:
Space station subsystems that use fluids may sustain failures which will result
in leakage. If a leak occurs within a pressurized compartment, the leak may
contaminate the atmosphere, cause damage to essential equipment or cause a fire
which could endanger crew safety. To minimize this hazard it is suggested that
only non-toxic and non-flammable fluids be used within pressurized compartments.
If toxic fluids are required, either for use i.n experiments or operations,
zpecial precautions should be _spelled out in handling procedures which require
the approval of a Safety Director.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 5. Equipment Impact.
6. Explosion
10. Temperature ExtremeL
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	
FO - 
1.24
TITLE:
	 Warning System--Contaminants Detection and Alarm
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIC NS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Stability and Control System, Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A visual and audible alarm should be provided to warn the crew of atmosphere
contamination which exceeds the limits established for crew safety. This
alarm should be provider, at a minizrum in the affected space station compart-
ment(s) and at the central command and control station(s).
REFERENCES:
I. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS) for potential hazard of atmosphere
contamination.
2. Atmospheric Contaminants in Spacecraf"u, Space Science Board, NAS-NRC,
October 1968.
3. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, Appendices 6A, B, C. List of
potential contaminants.
4. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 3-N, "Fire occurs within an
unmanned area."
5. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8H, 18D, 44,.ri, 48H ana
REMARKS:
Numerous contaminants (e.g., liquids, gases and particulate matter) are expected
to be present in any atmosphere used in a space station. As long as these
contaminants are controlled and kept within.. limits, crew safety will be ensured.
However, if the contaminant level exceeds these limits the crew must be provided
sufficient warning to allow them to take appropriate corrective action.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
A T­ n4' Vi+nl Q,...,,lio^
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Contamination
	 FO- 1.25
TITLE:
	 Warning System--Fluid Systems Contamination
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Con--*,.!./Life Support System
(F:C/ISS), Stability and Control System, Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
41,:,e the possibility uxi.>tc that a fluid in a system could become contaminated,
rr:Ea::: .:zould be provided t- ,
 _tect any contamination ana j,<. •ovide an alarm at
the .!^'imaand and control c(:i-,er(s).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11. SubE.ytitei Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leaksg^.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 6B.
REMARKS:
There can be many places in fluid systems where there is a possibility that
the fluid could be contaminated by another fluid; e.g., pressurized fluid
tanks and heat exchangers. if contamination of the fluid can seriously affect
the operation of systems or equipment which are essential to crew safety,
there snoll d be Nome means available for detecting this and alerting the crew
that fluid contaminatioa exist:;. Provisions should also be made for isolating
the contaminated systems, and procedure: established for purging and recharging
the system after corrective maintenance has been accomplished. This guideline
is directed toward fluid systems other than the spacecraft atmosphere system,
and drinking water supply.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 NO. 1.26
TITLE: Warning System--Hazardous Materials
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A system should be provided to monitor the environmental status of all
potentially hazardous (explosive, flammable, toxic, etc.) materials stored
on-board the space station and space base, and display a warning signal in
the command and control center(s) when established limits are exceeded.
REFERENCES.
1. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Paragraph 3.2.5, "Space Base Activation."
REMARKS:
This system would alert the crew of an "out-of-tolerance" condition and possible
impending emergencies. Remedial procedures should tie developed to counter each
hazardous situation for which detection capability is provided.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 NO. 1.27
TITLE: warning System--Relative Humidity
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Suppor t. System
(EC/.LSS), Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A warning and alarm system should be provided to alert the crew of atmosphere
r:lative humidity levels which are not within prescribed 1 1 .its, with the
warning displayed at the command and control center(s).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/ISS), for potential hazards of
excessive CO2 and atmosphere contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 18D and 48H.
REMARKS:
The space station equipment located in compartments inhabited by the crew is
designed to operate within a humidity range specified for crew comfort. Excess
tumidity could have a detrimental effect on the operation of equipment because
of water condensatio:i and could also result in decreased performance of the
crew. Therefore, the humidity should be monitored in all humidity-controlled
compartments.
Also applies to the follciing hazard group: 7. Illness and Injury
Ic
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Contamination
	 NO• 1.28
TITLE:
	 Waste Byproducts Control
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Provisions should be made for containing, venting or eliminating odors and
bacteria generated by waste products and other Sources, e.g., plants and
animals.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of atmos-
phere contamination.
2. NASA CR-1205.
3. M-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 21B and 45B.
REMARKS:
Equipment on-board a space station will provide for general atmosphere contami-
nation control. It appears desirable to have separate pr.Yvisions for containing,
venting, or otherwise eliminating contamination from know^i sources such as
byproducts of wastes.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 7. Illness and Injury
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Contp ,--nation	 NO. 1.29
TITLE: Water Contamination
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmenta? Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The composition of the grater should be checked at regular intervals to ensure
that contamination does not exceed prescribed limits.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazards of water
and/or food contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 31G, 48H, 59B and 76K.
REMARKS:
A potable water supply is necessary for the health and safety of the crew.
Therefore, the water supply should be monitored very closely for the presence
of contaminants. By one approach, the water composition would be monitored
continuously and automatically, and an alarm be provided the crew when
contamination becomes excessive. Alternately, the crew would be able to
perform a simple test on water samples at sufficiently regular intervals to
detect water contamination before it endangers the crew. This in particular
should apply to the water dispenser used for drinking water and food preserva-
tija.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 7. Illness and Injury
8. Loss of Vital Supplies
C
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Contaminaticn	 Np. 1.30
TITLE:
	 Water Sterilization
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A capability should be provided for maintaining the sterility of on-board
water supplies
REFERE NCES .
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazards of water
contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 21D and 30D.
REMARKS:
Once water is sterilized it will remain so as long as no leakage of contaminants
occurs and no substrate is available for organism growth. However, it is
assumed that occasional failures may result in contamination of the water
supply. Therefore, it is suggested that provisions be made to re-sterilize
stored water or to permit temporary sterilization at the point of use. It
would also be desirable to have the capabilit y to sterilize the complete water
reclamation system in case of severe contamination problems.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 7. Illness and Injury
8. Loss of Vital Supplies
- 
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D2- 113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 Np. 1.31
TITLE: water Storage Isolation
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
;dater storage systems should have provisions for isolating parts of the system
which may have become contaminated.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of water
contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 9C, 21B and 76C.
REMARKS:
If contamination is present it will be necessary to isolate the part of the
system that is contaminated so the necessary corrective action can be taken.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 7. Illness and Injury
8. Loss of Vital Supplies
C
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Contamination	 ENO -1.32
TITLE: Water Supply Location
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Water supplies should be stored in areas which will minimizE the possibility
of contamination from other spacecraft systems.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of water
contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Analysis, Propositions 21B and 76B.
REMARKS:
To decrease the chance of any of the water storage tanks becoming contaminated
.prom external sources, the tanks should not be located in proximity to other
systems or equipment that could possibly contaminate the water supply.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 7. Illness and Injury8. Loss of Vital Supplies
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cD2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Debris and Meteoroid Impact	 [NO •
	
2.1
TITLE: Component Design for Meteoroid Impact Protection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
System components should be designed to withstand the over-pressure and heat
pulse attendant to meteoroid penetration.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 12-J, "Conductor element fails
due to secondary causes."
2. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 7, "Meteoroid Penetration."
REMARKS:
The probability of meteoroid penetration appears to be low, but it is a hazard.
If a penetration does occur, the effects will probably be quite drastic,
including heat, shock, shrapnel, and decompression. Subsystem components, at
least those critical to crew safety, should be designed to withstand these
effects.
C
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Debris and Meteoroid Impact	 NO.	 2.2
TITLE:
	 Flight Path Orbit Selection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The original orbital flight path selection and changes required by station-
keeping during the mission should be such that the probability of collision
with man-made debris or other spacecraft is sufficiently low to provide:
adequate confidence in orbit selection and program decision to proceed.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 3-F, "Failure results from impact with
man-made objects."
REMARKS:
In-orbit collision presents a hazard to the spacecraft which should be minimized
through selection of a satisfactory orbit.
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Debris and Meteoroid Impact	 NO. 2.3
TITLE:
	 Insulating Material
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Materials used for insulation or filler in spacecraft walls should be non-
combustible.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6,
 Supporting Analyses, Section 7, "Meteoroid Penetration."
REMARKS:
Tests conducted by The Boeing Company have demcnstrated that combustible
insulation or filler material in spacecraft walls will be ignited by a meteoroid
penetration. Burning material is scattered throughout the affected compartment
and some of the material in the wall is consumed by fire.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 10. Temperature Extremes
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Debris and Meteoroid Impact
	 NO. 2.4
TITLE:
	 Window Replacement
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical (S/ M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Windows should be designed to permit replacement without degrading ti. pressure
or structural integrity of the space station.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsyetems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of structural
damage.
?. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969, Hazard Nos. 41
and 242.
3. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 9G, 16C and 48F.
REMARKS:
During a long-duration space mission there is a possibility that the optical
quality of the windows may become impaired by engine exhaust, erosion from
natural space debris, outgassing of :indow sealant, etc. The windows should be
able to withstand this damage and should be replaceable without a loss of cabin
pressure. Use of covers when windows are not in use should be considered.
Also applies to the following h-zard group: 5. Equipment Impact.
0
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure 	 NO. 3.1
TITLE:
	 Compartment Integril;y
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS. Structures/Mechanical Systems
SA;ETY GUIDELINE:
The individual Tressurizable compartments should be structurally desigard to
withstand a rapii decompression of any adjacent compartment.
REFERENCES:
1. I2-13..3070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 3-M,, "Substructure failure results from
internal pressure bulkhead failure."
REMARKS:
The overall structural integrity of the spacecraft should be maintained to
prevent cumulative catastrophic structural failure. The pressure compartment
bulkheads should also be capable of withstanding particle impacts or pressures
resulting from explosions in adjacent compartments.
L
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure	 UN70 3.2
TITLE:	 Crack Propagation in Primary Structure
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: structures/Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The spacecraft structure should be designed as a structural matrix with the
capability of arresting crack or tear growth.
REFERENCES:
I. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-J, "Failure of pressure retention
results from failure of .structural matrix."
REMARKS:
The structural design should be
create additional or cumulative
be designed to halt the potentii
cc
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure 	 NO. 3.3
TITLE:
	 Equipment Design for Rapid Decompression
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFEW GUIDELINE:
Equipment located in pressurized compartments should be designed to withstand
the changing environment associated with rapid decorpression of the space
station/ base.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS),fbr potential hazard of loss of
cabin pressure.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 5-E, "Emergency equipment inoperative
due to damage from effects of decompression."
3. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September 1969, Hazard No. 29.
4. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 9B.
REMARKS:
Equipment located in pressurized compartments may be subjected to the effects
of rapid decompression at some time during a long-duration space mission.
Sore of this equipment may be essential to the long-term safety of the crew.
To avoid further degradat ; on of crew safety and assure continued operation
during a critical period, all such equipment should be designed to withstand
rapid decompression without failure. Equipment should also be designed and/oi
procedures developed to preclude equipment damage that might result from
Dperating in the depressurized environment.
C
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP:
	 Decompression/Overpressure	 ENO
	 3.4
TITLE:
	 Hatch Automatic Closure
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Automatic closure of hatches between pressurized compartments of the space
station, when cabin pressure decreases below a specified limit, should be con-
sidered as a design feature.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of cabin pressure.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompr(-ssion), 1-E ,  "Decompression results from failure
of spacecraft pressure retention."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Prcpositions 8C and 12E.
RE MAR KS:
Implementation of this guideline would minimize loss of cabin aimcsphere and
possible damage to equipment when the cause of the pressure loss is located in
only one of the compartments. The automatic closing hatches should have the
capability of being manually overridden.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure
	 FO - 3.5
TITLE:	 Hatch Closure
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, Structures/Mechanical (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Hatches between compartments should be closed except whin required for crew
transit.
REFERENCES.
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-H, "All crew members are exposed to
decompression," 6-E, "Decompression rate exceeds procedure response time,"
and 9-K, "Hatch or other access to area undergoing decompression is open."
2. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis."
REMARKS:
This guideline -s of special significance in that the effectiveness of contain-
ing and isolating hazards in a given compartment will depend on the extent to
which this instruction is implemented with respect to other on-board procedures.
Due to the limitations imposed by this guideline, a trade study may be required
to consider possible alternatives such as the following:
a. Partial isolation wherein two or more compartments would comprise a
volume entity by leaving the hatches between them normally open.
b. No isolation in order to:
(1) Facilitate normal traffic flow.
(2) Facilitate quick egress of crew members from the affected compart-
ment to a more remote location.
(3) Utilize the maximum available net volume while evaluating the emer-
gency condition and determining the course of action to be taken,
should an undesired event occur.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 2. Debris and Meteoroid Impact
5. Equipment Impact
6. Explosion
10. Temper at:lre Extremes
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/overpressure
	 NO• 3.6
TITLE:	 Hatch Positive Closure
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A means should be provided fcr visual inspection of the hatch as well as a
Warning system,as a safety check to assure that hatches or other accesses to
an area at a different pressure level have been secured properly. Warning
system displays should be at the hatch and at the command and control center(s).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 3-0, "Pressure hatch fails due to
improper latching or securing."
REMARKS:
The intent of this guideline is to provide a means of assuring proper hatch
closure. Positive hatch closure is required to maintain the total pressure
integrity of the isolated volume involved.
0
- 68 -
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure 	 NO 3.7
TITLE: Hatch Pressure Loading
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Pressure hatches providing access to an area of differential pressure should
be of a type that becomes more positively engaged under pressure loading.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -10, FT-1 (Decompression), 3-N, "Failure of pressure hatch
results from excessive pressure loading."
REMARKS:
This feature basically* would pertain to exterior hatches, but could also apply
to hatches between two pressurized compartments, in which one compartment is at
a higher pressure than the other; e.g., biological studies, airlock operation,
etc.
c
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUPS Decompression/Overpressure 	 NO
	
3.8
TITLE: Hatch Seal Leakage Rate
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Hatch design should be such that loss of a hatch seal element will not result
in a pressure leakage rate which exceeds the emergency recompression system
rate.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (decompression), 3-P, "Pressure hatch fails due to
failure of seal element."
REMARKS:
A single failure of the hatch assembly should not create additional or
cumulative failures leading to the catastrophic_ failure of the pressure shell.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure
	
ENO • 3.9
TITLE:
	 Hatchway Airlocks
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mecharical, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Provision should be made for an airlock in the hatch or hatchway between sepa-
rately pressurizable compartments.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 3, "Analysis of Operations," and
Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis."
REMARKS:
In the event of an emergency in any compartment a desirable procedure is to
contain the emergency to its original site by closing all entrances to the
compartment. If the compartment is manned, however, evacuation of crew members
may also be desired. If an airlock were provided it would allow for both con-
taining the emergency and evacuating personnel. Also, if a compartment is de-
pressurized, an airlock would facilitate access to the compartment for repair or
rescue purposes. An alternate possibility would be a portable airlock which
could be brought to the emergency site as necessar;r. This guideline becomes
particularly significant for a space station comprising only a small number of
compartments.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
6. Explosion
7. Illness and Injury
10. Temperature Extremes
C
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure	 E-L3. 10
TITLE: Leakage Repair System
APPLIC;.SLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Structures/Mechanical (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A leakage repair system employing techniques and equipment appropriate to the
vacuum and gravity environment of the space station/base should be provided
on-board the spacecraft.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-L, "Crew exposed and protective action
riot initiated through use of emergency equipment;" and 1-M, "Crew exposed
and protective action not initiated through emergency procedures."
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of no airlock
capability.
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 10G.
REMARKS:
The procedures and equipment required to perform repairs should be compatible
with the movement and handling limitations imposed by the wearing of a pressure
suit. IT is desirable that repairs be performed by NA rather than EVA.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure 	 NO, 3.11
TITLE:
	 Medical Equipment for Emergencies
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems, Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Consideration should be given to providing the equipment and supplies necessary
for general cardiopulmonary resuscitation arid. other equipment and supplies that
might be required for the individualized treatment of residual effects of
decompression.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 5 -C, "Decompression emergency equipment
is nonexistent at the time required."
2. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, "Human Requirements."
REMARKS:
Of the equipment and supplies to be considered, decompression and/or hyperbaric
chambers do not appear warranted. Due to the bulk, weight, and functional
characteristics, such features might be combined with other spacecraft facilities
(e.g., airlock) to satisfy multiple operational requirements. As a "configura-
tion driver," this should be evaluated early in the conceptual phase.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 7. Illness and Injury
c
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure	 NO- 3.12
TITLE:	 pressure Regulator Failure
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Environmental Control/Life
Support System (EC/LSS), Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All pressure relief valves should be designed to protect against a regulator
failed or stuck in the x'ull cpen position.
REFERENCES:
1. Space Flight Hazard Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969, Hazard No. 68.
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
REMARKS:
Inability of a relief vale to adequately relieve resultant pressure from a full
open regulator could damage downstream equipment, impair its operation,. or rup-
ture the pressure vessel (line).
- 74 -
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/overpressure	 NO• 3.13
TITLE:
	 Pressure Relief for Trapped Fluids
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/PUNCTIONSr Enviro=ental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Stability and Control System (SCS"
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Plumbing systems which carry cryogens or hydrogen peroxide should be designed
such that adequate pressure relief capability exists in those areas most likely
to trap the fluids. Furthermore, to guard against the possibility that a
relief valve in these systems becomes frozen shut or otherwise rendered inopera-
tive, a backup pressure relief device, such as burst disks, should be incorpo-
rated in parallel with the valves.
REFERENCES:
1. Space Flight Hazard Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969" Hazard No. 76.
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analyses (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
REMARKS s
Though high pressure fluid systems should be designed to avoid entrapment of the
fluids, design constraints may still permit this to occur. Special considera-
tion should be given to design features which would compensate for this entrap-
ment by ensuring adequate excess pressure relief.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUPs Decompression/Overpressure	 NO• 3.14
TITLE: pressure System Depressurizatim
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All pressure systems should be designed to enable a planned depressurization;
accurate sensors should be incorporated to ensure that the pressure is totally
relieved prior to opening the system should that requirement arise for mainte-
nance or other reasons.
REFERENCES:
1. Space Flight Hazard Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969, Hazard No. 129.
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss of
cabin pressure.
REMARKS s
Opening a pressure system prior to total depressurization could create a hazard
to personnel or equipment in the immediate vicinity, as well as subject equip-
ment on that system to possible damage from explosive decompression.
- 76 —
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/overpressure	 FNO • 3.15
TITLE: Pressurizable Volume Relief Protection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSIEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Stability and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Any pressurizable volume '.:hat can be confined or isolated by any means, such as
by valves, should include some means for automatic protection from overpressure.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS) for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
2. D2-113070-10, IT-1 (Decompression), 4-G, "Loss of subsystem function results
in overpressurization of structure."
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 13D, 60D and 61D.
REMARKS:
All systems which use pressurized fluids should be examined to identify those
portions which are confined or could be confined by closing valves or by other
means. This condition could result in overpressures and subsequent rupture or
explosion, or leakage and contamination, that may affect crew safety. There-
fore, it is necessary to provide some means of protecting these volumes with
an overpressure device such as an automatic relief valve.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure	 F, 3.16
TITLE: pressurized Gas Flow Restriction
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Envirom.-ata.t Control/Life support System
(EC/LSS), Stability and Control (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Pressurized gas supplies should include restrictions that will limit gas flow
in the event of a pressurized gas plumbing failure, to that which can be handled
by the relief valves or venting system.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 15C and 16F.
REMARKS:
In some installations it may be possible for a pressurized gas line to fail so
that the total gas supply would be dumped directl-r i-Ac a compartment. If this
flow is greater than the relief or venting capability of the compartment, over-
pressurization could result. Therefore, flow restrictions should be incorporated
at the pressure source to restrict the gas flow to that which can be handled by
the relief or venting system.
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HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/overpressure
	 NO• 3.17
TITLE:
	 primary Structure Inspection and Repair
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Strt.ctures/Mechanical Systems (S/M),
Operations, Environmental Control/Life Support System (EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Design of spacecraft structure and equipment, including their interfaces, should
be such that all portions of the pressure shell, bulkheads and seals will be
accessible for damage inspection and repair. This should apply to exterior as
well as to interior spacecraft surfaces.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-J, "Failure of pressure retention
results from failure of structural matrix."
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of cabin pressure.
3. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 48B and 1+8F.
REMARKS:
There is a distinct possibility that the pressure wall and/or pressure seals
of a manned spacecraft will sustain appreciable damage before it completes a
long-duration mission. When this occurs, it will be necessary to repair the
damage to prevent excessive loss of cabin air, thereby enhancing the possibility
of continuing crew safety throughout the mission.
To the extent possible, it is suggested that access to the pressure shell and
bulkheads be gained via the interior of the spacecraft.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 2. Debris and Meteoroid Impact
5. Equipment Impact
6. Explosion
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HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure	 NO. 3.18
TITLE: Rapid Decompression Effects
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems, Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The potentLal],y harmful effects on crew members of rapid decompression should be
minimized through engineering considerations in selection of the spacecraft
atmospheric composition, pressure, and canpartment net volume.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-A, "Crew members will be in immediate
danger of directly fatal exposure to decompression."
2. NASA SP-117, Space Cabin Atmospheres, Part III, Physiological Factors cf
Inert Gases.
3. NASA SP-118, Space Cabin Atmospheres, Part IV, Engineering Tradeoffs of One-
Versus Two-Gas Systems.
REMARKS:
The possible detrimental effects of rapid decompression are dependen-^ upon
the rate of change of total pressure. Thus, trade studies involving the above
engineering considerations should reflect their influence upon the time available
for crew response and the corrective action required during an emergency leak
situation.
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HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure
	 FNO 3.19
TITLE:	 Spacecraft Structural Strength
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical Systems (3/1-1)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The spacecraft should be of sufficient structural strength to safely maintain
the required internal pressure within the expected launch and mission environ-
ment for the period of orbital stay.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-J, "Failure of pressure retention
results from failure of structural matrix."
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of structural
damage.
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 16c and 52B.
REMARKS:
The above references provide the context for this guideline. This represents
the basic structural requirement to be met by a manned spacecraft.
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HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure	 NO.
	 3.20
TITLE: Vented Component Replacement
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Components which are vented to space (vacuum) should be replaceable without
requiring cabin depressurization.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of cabin pressure.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 4-F, "Loss of subsystem function
results in spacecraft pressure dump."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 43F.
REMARKS:
Certain components of the EC/LSS are vented to space (vacuum) or unpressurized
areas of the space station. These components should be designed and installed
so they can be replaced without loss of cabin pressure and without requiring
EVA .
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HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure 	 F0 - 3.21
TILE: Venting of Cabin Pressure
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Electrical Power, Stability and Control, Experiments
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Cabin pressure should not be vented to space through compartments or outlets
that are used to vent other fluids.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss of
cabin pressure.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 15K and 16C.
REMARKS:
Compartments or outlets to which fluids other than the spacecraft atmosphere
are vented would be subject to freezing of the fluids. This could prevent the
venting of cabin atmosphere and result in overpressurization of the cabin.
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HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure E 3.22
TITLE:	 Venting of Pressure Relief Devices
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/ISS), Stability and Control System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Pressure relief devices for all pressurized volumes should be vented to areas
that will not endanger the crew or equipment.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 60D and 61D.
REMARKS:
Guideline provides for relief protection of confined pressure volumes. If the
pressure relief action does occur, it is necessary to ensure that the vented
fluid will not contaminate the crew's atmosphere, will not endanger the crew
by direct exposure or will not damage or contaminate system equipment. There-
fore, pressure relief devices should be vented co areas that will avoid these
problems.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
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HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure 	 NO. 3.23
TITLE: Venting Provisions
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System,
St:•uctures/Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All cabin atmosphere overboard relief or "dump" valves (any valve venting into
space) should be fail-safe in the closed position and should be self-indicating
when failed. Manual override or redundant manual valving should be provided as
backup.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 4-F, "Loss of suosystem function results
in spacecraft pressure dump."
REMARKS:
There should be positive measures to prevent or limit any single failure from
progressinr. into the complete loss of pressure in a compartment.
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HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/overpressure
	 NO, 3.24
TITLE: Warning Systems, Cabin Pressure
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Total cabin pressure sensors should he provided to detect ouc-of-tolerance
values of the total cabin pressure. Detection of pressure change at an excessive
rate, or outside the desired operating range, should activate an alarm system to
warn the crew to initiate appropriate remedial action. The alarm should be
activated both in the affected space station comparZr:ent and at the commend and
control center(s).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss of
cabin pressure.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8C, 241, 48H, and 481.
REMARKS:
The space station crew should be warned of abnormal cabin pressure situations
in time to take the necessary corrective action to ensure crew safety.
0
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HAZARD GROUP: Decompression/Overpressure 	 LO 3.25
TITLE: Warning Systems, Fail-Safe
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All pressure warning systems should include provisions for self-test and should
be self-indicating when in the failed state.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 5-B, "Emergency equipment is inoperative
at time required."
REMARKS:
Safety devices and warning systems should inherently provide for verification
and assurance that they will operate properly when and if required.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
9. Radiation
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 ENO 4.1
TITLE:
	
Cable Insulation Damage
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Wire bundles sho•:1d be so routed and protected as to preclude damage to the
insulation through flexing or bumping.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 12-E, "Insulation fails due to
physical damage."
REMARKS:
Insulation failure and the resultant possibility of arcing, fire,or equipment
failure may be caused by physical abuse of the cable.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 NO. 4.2
TITLE:
	
Connector Mismating
APPLICAPLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Comm & Data Mgmt., Electrical Power,
Envircn. Control/Life Support, Experimer s, Stability & Control
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Suitable positive means, such as keying, should be provided to preclude
accidental mismating of electrical connectors. This would be especially
significant for connectors which are to be connected and disconnected during
flight operations (e.g., experiments).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 12-P, "Conductor element is
severed due to secondary events," and 12-Q, "Conductor element fails due
to erroneous mating of connectors, or other procedural error."
REMARKS:
Electrical arcing leading to fire, or dangerous stray currents, could be caused
by attempts to erroneously mate connectors. Failure reports of current systems
show this to be an area which is critical to system safety.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 FO - 4.3TITLE: Electrical Arcing
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Comm. & Data Mgmt., Electrical Power,
Envircn. Control/Life Support, Experiments, Stability & Control
SAFETY GJIDELINE:
ron,sileration should be given to design of electrical subsystem components
(e.., wall switches, light bulbs, or hot plates) to protect them from wear-out
or inadvertent breakage, which could result in generating shorts or arcing.
REFERENCES:
L. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 12-C, "Potential is available due
`c failure of electrical component."
REMARKS:
The undesired events described above could not only be an ignition source for
fire/explosion but could lead to other hazards such as electrical shock to
crew members or undesired stray currents to other equipment. Components which
are liable to arc when worn should be designed so there is a very low probability
of wear-out occuring during the mission. Alternatively, replacement times should
be specified and closely observed to ensure that such units are operationally
safe.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
7. Illness and Injury
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 ENO- 4.4
TITLE:
	
Electrical Connections
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr Electrical Power System, Experiments,
Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINES
All temporary electrical connections (outlets, connectors, etc.) should be so
designed and/or operated as to to eliminate the possibility of arcing.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 11-E, "An electrical power source
produced an electrical arc for ignition."
2. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134,.September, 1969, Hazard No. 43.
REMARKS:
Normal electrical outlets, connectors, etc., are capable of arcing when being
mated, unmated, or during use. Design modifications or operational procedu;:- es
to avoid this problem may be desirable.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
n
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 Fo. 4.5
TITLE: Electrical Cable Shorts
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Wire bundles should not be located near potential heat sources, including
those areas where a potential fcr fire exists.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 12-D, "Insulation fails due to
an external heat source."
REMARKS:
Insulation failure and the resultant possibility of arcing, fire, or equipment
failure may be caused by a heat source external to the cable.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 NO • 4.6
TITLE: Electrical Connector Checks
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Comm. I Data Mgmt., Electrical Power,
Environ. Control/Life Support, Experiments,-Stability & Control
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Provision should be made to assure proper pin connection at all critical
electrical connectors prior to application of system voltage. Verification
should be made to assure that all pin connections exist as designed, no pin-
to-pin shorts exist, and that no pin-to-shell shorts exist.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 12-N, "Conductor element fails
shorted due to bent pin or other internal misalignment."
REMARKS:
Electrical arcing leading to fire, or dangerous stray currents, could be
caused by bent pin(s) in an electrical connector. Failure r.ports of current
systems show this to be an area which is critical to system safety.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP:	 Electrical NO-	 4.7
TITLE:
	 Grounding of Spacecraft and Equipment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS:
	 All
SUIDELINE:
ipment and substructure should be grounded to the basic spacecraft
structure.
REFERENCES:
1.	 D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 11 -F, "A static electrical dis-
charge provides ignition source," and 11-G, "An electrical arc is accidental-
ly provided during system operation."
REMARKS:
Ungrounded equipment permits build-up of an electric potential or static charge
which could be discharged to form an arc or spark.
Also applies to the following hazard groups:	 6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
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wHAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 FO 4.8
TITLE:
	 potential Difference--Docking Spacecraft
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A means should be provided to equalize electric potential differences between
docking spacecraft.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6,
 Supporting Analyses, Section 3, "Analysis of Operations."
REMARKS:
A difference in electrical potential may develop between the space station/base
and associated spacecraft, such as the space shuttle, space tug, or free-flying
experiment modules. During docking an electrical arc could be caused which
could result in damage to the docking mechanism, seals, etc. Discharging the
potential differences by a device intended for that purpose would preclude
damage to the spacecraft.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 3. Decompression/overpressure6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 NO• 4.9
TIDE:	 power Distribution Paths Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Multiple power distribution paths to essential electrical equipment should be
provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of loss of
electrical power.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 10D and 10F.
REMARKS:
The distribution system for power should be designed so that essential equipment
can be operated from more than one power bus. This is to preclude the loss of
essential electrical equipment when there is a failure in the primary power
distribution path to the equipment. At a minimum, essential equipment so pro-
tected should include lighting, EC/LSS, communications equipment and computers.
L -	 I
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 NO • 4.10
TITLE: Power Source Monitors
	 9APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power (EP)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Sensors should be provided to detect out-of-tolerance values for critical
electrical power source parameters, such as voltage, frequency, current,
temperature, etc., or momentary excessive power surges resulting from equipment
turn-on or turn-off. The sensors should activate an alarm system at the com-
mand and control center(s) of deviations from the desired parameter values.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of loss of
electrical power.
2. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969, Hazard No. 150.
REMARKS:
i'he electrical power system is essential to the operation of the space station
and equipment which is vital to crew safety. A warning should be given, visually
and/or audibly, depending on the particular situation, of any abnormal operation
of the electrical power equipment in time to take the necessary correc,,ive action.
Consideration should also be given to the provision of automatic shut-down or
isolation of power sources when specified parameters exceed operating limits
wh.ch, if allowed to ccntinue, could develop i ptc a h=%zardous situation before
appropriate manual action could be taken.
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 [NCO. 4.11
TITLE: power Sources Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power (EP)
SAFETY GUIDELINE.
Multiple or redundant primary electrical power sources should be provided such
uat u single failure will not result in complete loss of primary electrical
poi:er, or cause failure of equipment which is unable to survive momentary power
i:iterruptions.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -11, Subsystems Analysis (E-°), for potential hazard of loss of
electrical power.
2. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969, Hazard No. 39.
D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 10F.
REMARKS:
A complete loss of primary electrical power wo,''id jeopardize the safety of the
crew. Therefore, the power system should be designed so more than one source
of power is available at all times to supply the main distribution system.
The power sources should be located or the distribution system arranged so a
single failure can only result in the loss of the affected power source and
its associated distribution system. Furthermore, to avoid .nomentary power inter-
ruptions such as might occur during switch-over from primary to stand-by power,
all equipment which is sensitive to this anomaly should be powered by active
redundant power sources.
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 NO• 4.12
TITLE: Protective Covers for Electrical Equipment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power, Comm. & Data Mgmt.,
Environ. Control/Life Support, Experiments, Stability and Control
SAFETY GUIDELINES
Protective covers should be provided for all portions of the electrical sub-
system to which access is required (switch boards, terminal boards, etc.).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 12-P, "Conductor element is
severed due to secondary events."
2. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, HISC 00134, September 1969, Hazard No. 36.
REMARKS:
Dangerous stray currents, or a source of ignition from accidental generation of
an arc, could be produced through a procedural error, facilitated by exposed
pins or other exposed conductors.
Failure reports from current systems show this to be a condition that can lead to
failure. Covers also would provide protection from metallic debris floating in
a zero-gravity environment.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 6. Explosion
1U. Temperature Extremes
n
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical EO  x+.13TITLE: 	 Redundant Circuits
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power, Crew System, Environmental
Control/Life Support, Stability and Control
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Redundant electrical circuits for items critical to crew safety should not
be included in the same wire bundle.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of loss of
electrical power.
REMARKS:
Items which are critical to crew safety will usually require redundancy. This
requirement would be defeated by including the involved electrical circuits in
the same wire bundle since damage to or disconnection of the bundle might
render bath primary and redundant circuits inoperative.
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HAZARD GROUP: Electrical	 NO. 4.14
TITLE:	 Routing of Power Distribution Lines
APPLICABLE SI11SYSIEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power (EP)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Power distribution wires should be routed in such a manner that any damage
resulting from a fire, caused by a fault in the distribution system, will have a
minimal effect on other power distribution wires in the vicinity.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazards of fire,
smoke, toxicity.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 5-D, "Electrical system component
heated through electrical system fault."
RLMARKS:
Distribution cf power to the various subsystems in the spacecraft could be inter-
rupted, and redundancy provisions negated, unless care is taken to separate power
distribution bundles sufficiently to avoid the possibility of secondarily-
inflicted damage.
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HAZARD GROUP:
	 Equipment Impact FO.
	 5.1
TITLE:
	 Bulk Cargo Restraint
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: 	 Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All bulk cargo should be properly tethered or otherwisF controlled during zero-
gravity or reduced-gravity operations.
REFERENCES:
1.	 D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 7-L, "Damage occurs during bulk cargo
or personnel transfer."
2.	 D2-113070 -6,
 Supporting Analyses, Section, "Analysis of Operations."
REMARKS:
The intent of this guideline is to provide protection of the spacecraft structure
(and personnel inside cargo compartments) through proper control of cargo mass
during handling in the zero-gravity condition.
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HAZARD GROUP: Equipment Impact	 NO-	 5.2
TITLE:
	 Crew Restrictions During Docking
APPLICABLE SUBSYS1EMS/FUNCTIONSt Operations, Structures/Mechanical Systems
(S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Activity of crew members not directly involved in docking operations with other
vehicles should be restricted to areas atructurally and environmentally isolated
from the docking interfaces.
REFERENCES:
1. 1)2-113070-6,
 Supporting Analyses, Paragraph 3.1.6, Additional Manning or
Crew Rotation Missions," and Paragraph 3.3.3, "Docking of Logistic Vehicle."
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 3
-C, "Structural matrix failure results
from damage during space operations."
3. 02-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of docking
accident.
4. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Proposition 8C.
REMARKS:
The intent of the guideline is to minimize the number of crew members exposed
to a potential hazard during close-in maneuvering and docking operations.
Considerations should be given to evacuating crew members from and depressurizing
the compartment to which docking is being made. More experience in space ferry-
ing and in use of space "tugs" to dock large vehicles must be acquired before the
hazards involved in docking operations can be assessed accurately and normal crew
locations during such operations assigned with confidence.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 3. Decompression/Overpressure
0-
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HAZARD GROUP: Equipment Impact
	 NO- 5.3
TITLE:
	 Docking Closure Rate Control
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS),
Structures/Mechanical (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Closure rates during docking maneuvers should be monitored and an automatic
attitude control override capability provided to preclude closure rates from
exceeding specified limits.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (SCS at^d S/M), for potential hazards of
loss of attitude control and docking accident.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 7-K, "Damage accurs during logistic
vehicle docking operations."
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 12E and 3;,B.
REMARKS:
Excessive closure rates during docking maneuvers could result in damage to the
spLcecraft involved and possible tumbling in excess of that considered
acceptable for crew safety. Therefore, the closure rates should be automaticall.
monitored, and if the rates exceed specified limits, the attitude control system
should automatically take corrective action to prevent impact.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 11. Spacecraft Acceleration
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HAZARD GROUP: Equipment Impact	 [NO - 5.4
TITLE: Docking Light Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical (S/M), Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Redundancy should be provided for the docking lights at each port. The redundant
lights should be powered from a different source than the primary lights.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of docking
accident.
2. D2-113070-10 2 FT-1 (Decompression), 7-K, "Damage occurs during logistic
vehicle docking operations."
3. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, "Analysis of Operations."
4. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 1OF and 46B.
REMARKS:
During docking operations it is necessary to provide continuous lighting of the
docking area to ensure adequate visibility to avoid accidents. To make sure
that continuous lighting of the docking area is available, even though the
primary lighting has failed, a separate and independently powered lighting system
should be provided. If more than one docking port is provided and it can be
assured that another docking port with operating lights will be available, then
it may not be necessary to have redundant docking lights at all docking ports.
-1o6-
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HAZARD GROUP:
	 Equipment Impact [NO •	 5.5
TITLE:
	 Docking Port Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: 	 Structures/Mechanical (S/M), Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE.
A space station/base should be provided with more than one docking port.
REFERENCES:
1.	 D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of docking
accident.
2.	 D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 7-K, "Damage occurs during logistic
vehicle docking operations."
3.	 D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 80B.
REMARKS:
Docking accidents or docking port equipment failure could result in the port
being temporarily unusable.	 To ensure continuous availability of a docking
port, more than one should be provided.	 The total number of docking ports Will
depend upon factors such as the size of the space station, the crew size, and
the frequency of docking operations.
- 107 -
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Equipment Impact
	 FO.- 5.6TITLE:
	 Equipment Operation During EVA
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Operation of equipment that could endanger EVA personnel should be avoided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of crew injury
or illness.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 32B, 32C, 32E and 38C.
REMARKS:
In some cases, the operation of externally-mounted equipment can create a
hazard that extends beyond the physical dimensions of the equipment, e.g.,
exhaust plume of thrusters, jettisoning of waste products, RF radiation, move-
ment of solar panels or antennas. When EVA is being performed in the vicinity
of this type of equipment, procedures should be available that will preclude
the operation of this equipment.
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HAZARD GROUP: Equipment Impact	 [NO • 5.7
TITLE: Exterior Equipment Design and Location
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The design and location of equipment on exterior surfaces of the space station
(e.g., solar panels, antennas) should minimize their hazards to EVA personnel
or to other exterior operations such as rendezvous and docking.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of crew injury
or illness.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression, 2-G, "Damage results from pressure suit
tear."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 52C.
REMARKS:
When determining the external configuration of a space station and the equipment
to be located there, consideration should be given to the activities or opera-
tions that will be taking place exterior to the space station. Unfortunate
location, improper design, or lack of shielding protection for this equipment
could impose unnecessary hazards to exterior operations.
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HAZARD GROUP: Equipment Impact	 NO. 5.8
TITLE:	 Injury or Damage from Spacecraft Equipment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Space station equipment, both interior and exterior, should be designed to
minimize elanger of injury to the crew or damage to pressure suits during all
activities.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Cubsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazards of crew injury
or illness and for EVA equipment failure.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 2-C, "Loss of pressure suit pressure
retention results from suit damage"; and 2-G, "Damage results from pressure
suit tear."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram ) Propositions 27C, 46B, 52C and 76G.
REMARKS:
Because of the volume limitations of space stations, cre-,r members will be
performing their normal activities in close proximity to meuly items of equip-
ment. If not designed properly, this equipment could present a hazard to shirt-
sleeved crew members. Therefore, this equipment should be designed to minimize
dangers to the crew from sharp projections, hot or cold surfaces, excessive
acceleration, vibration, noise, electrical current, etc.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 7. Illness and Injury
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HAZARD GROUP: Equipment Impact
	 NO.	 5.9
TITLE: Mechanical Shielding of Electrical Equipment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Comm. & Data Mgmt., Electrical Power,
Environ. Control/Life Support, Experiments, Stability and Control
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Mechanical shielding shou'_d be provided to protect electrical equipment,
including intra-equipment wire bundles, from possible external physical injury,
but allow access wher. required for repair or replacement.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 12-D, "Insulation fails due to
an external heat source," 12-E, "Insulation fails due to physical damage,"
12-0, "Conductor element fails shorted due to foreign :naterial," and 12-P.
Conductor element is severed due to secondary events."
REMARKS:
Human error, or shrapnel from an explosion or meteorite, could damage insulation
and cause a short, with the possibility of arcing and/or fire. Early design
should consider locating wire bundles (cables) in protected areas.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 2. Debris and Meteoroid Impact
4. Electrical
6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
11. Spacecraft Acceleration
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HAZARD GROUP: Equipment Impact	 [NO • 5.10
TITLE: Mobility Aids, Zero Gravity
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crean System (CA), Structures/Mechanical
(S/M), Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Adequate restraints, tethers or aids to assist the crew in personal movements
and handling large-mass equipment should be available throughout the interior
and exterior of the space sution.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analyeis (CS and S/M), for potential hazards of
crew injury or illness and structural damage.
2. D2-113070 -6,
 Supporting Analyses, Section 3, "Analysis of Operations."
3. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 9E, 13C, 13r, 18E, 32C and 48E.
REMARKS:
In the weightless environment, the movement of crew members and equipment can
sometimes be hazardous,with a potential of endangering the crew. Large masses,
whether equipment or personnel, have a possibility of achieving high momentums
which can be dangerous if not held in check. Therefore, adequate restraints,
tethers, or other aids should be located throughout the interior and exterior of
the space station to assist crew member movements and equipment handling.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 7. Illness and Injury
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HAZARD GROUP:  Equipment Impact 	 NO • 5.11
TITLE:	 pressure Suit Repair
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Environmental Control/Life
Support System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Pressure suits should be designed so that minor repairs can be made to the suit.
REFERENCES:
_. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of EVA
equipment failure.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-G, "Decompression, results from failure
of pressure suit pressure retention."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 33E.
REMARKS:
There is a definite possibility that minor damage (e.g., tears in fabric,
seal failure) could be inflicted on the pressure suits during a long-term
mission. With the proper repair capability, the crew should be able to restore
pressure suits sustaining such damage to serviceable use. This will also reduce
the requirements for storing complete spare pressure suits.
c
i
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E
HAZARDROUP: Equipment Impact
	 NO• 5.12
otating Machinery Shielding
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Electrical Power (EP), Environmental
Control^Life Support System, Stability b Control
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Equipment that uses high-speed rotating components should be adequately
shielded to prevent a wheel failure from causing damage to other equipment,
and should not be located in compartments devoted to crew health and well-
being.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of fire,
smoke, toxicity.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 52C, 52D and 58D.
REMARKS:
High-speed rotating components have an inherent danger associated with the
possibility of a wheel rupturing and ceasing severe damage to other equipment
or structural damage t., the compartment or space station. Equipment that
contains high-speed rotating components, therefore, should be shielded suffi-
ciently to contain any wheel rupture that might occur.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 3. Decompression/overpressure
10. Temperature Extremes
(
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HAZARD GROUP: Explosion	 Fo •	 6.1
TITLE.
	 Electrical Ignition
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Comm. & Data Mgmt., Electricai Power,
Environmental Control/Life Support, Experiments, Staoility and Control
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A_1 relays, including motor start relays, level sensing devices, switches, cam
contacts, commutators, etc., which can produce an electrical arc, should be
hermetically sealed. This seal should continue to provide full protection
during and after being subjected to deep vacuum.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 11-H, "An electrical arc is pro-
vided during normal system operation."
REMARKS:
Arcing relays, switches, commutators, etc., provide a ready source of ignition
for an accidentally generated explosive atmosphere. To cause a fire/explosion
this event would have to be coupled with a combustible atmosphere or material.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1, Contamination
4. Electrical
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Explosion	 [NO.	 6.2
TITLE:
	 Explosion-proof Electrical Equipment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Electrical equipment should be sufficiently enclosed to prevent a self-induced
explosion from spreading beyond the equipment itself.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EP), for potential hazard of fire,
smoke, toxicity.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), ll -E, "An electrical power source
produces an electrical arc for ignition."
REMARKS:
Electrical equipment inherently includes a potential ignition source for fire
or explosion which should be controlled by designing to contain any internal
explosion that might occur. Any gases escaping as a result of such an explosion
should be at a lower temperature than the kindling temperature of the surrounding
atmosphere.
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HAZARD GROUP: Explosion	 FNO -
	 6.3
TITLE: Flammable/Explosive Material Exterior to Spacecraft
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Deign of overboard vent/dump mechanisms should preclude the possibility of
ac-waulation of flammable/explosive or toxic material near the space station.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 3-N, "Fire occurs within an
unmanned area."
REMARKS:
Accumulation of such materials could lead to hazardous conditions during
operations external to the spacecraft.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Explosion	 NO •	 6.4
TI TLE : Hazardous ltixtm-es
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical, Environmental
Control/Life Support, Experiments, Stability & Control, Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Drain or vent lines should not be routed in a manner that could generate a
hazardous mixture or allow feed-back of hazardous substances to the components
being drained or vented.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 3-N, "Fire occurs within an
unmanned area," and 7-R, "Explosion in remote ai _s not contained and
propagates to vicinity of.crew."
REMARKS:
If two or more materials which would fo:m hypergolic or flammable mixtures are
vented through a common outlet, an explosion or fire could occur within the
vent or external to the spacecraft.
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HAZARD GROUP: Explosion	 FO- 6. 5
TITLE: Pressure Subsystem Interconnection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
In subsystems where a possibility exists of misconnecting from one pre^sure
.level into a component of a different pressure level, the subsystem should be
designed to safely contain the higher pressure.
%EFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 12-J, "Failure results from reverse or
incorrect installation of system components."
REMARKS:
Pressure system as used herein is defined as consisting of vessels, pumps,
tubing, valves, instrumentation,and all hardware that contains liquids or
gases under any pressure above 0.1 mm Hg absolute.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
3. Decompression/Overpressure
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HAZARD GROUP: Explosion	 NO- 6.6
TITLE:
	 pressure System Dynamics
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The spacecraft pressure system and related components should be capable of
withstanding all structural, acceleration, or other loads which are not of
hydraulic or pneumatic origin, simultaneously with proof pressure, without
permanent set, damage, or leakage at maximum operating temperature.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 12-F, "Failure results from inadequate
design analysis of the liquid system dynamics."
REMARKS:
A complete structural analysis should be conducted on all pressure systems.
For spacecraft systems this should include the "worst case" consideration of
vibration stress risers, surge and shock stresses, acceleration loading, and
thermal degradation of strength, as applicable.
n
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HAZARD GROUP: Explosion	 [NO • 6.7
TITLE:
	 pressure Systems Location
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Stability and Control System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Pressure systems should not be located in proximity to other sources of high
energy, such as heat, voltage, and leakage from other systems, unless adequate
,hielding is provided.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems analysis (ECASS), for potential hazard of fluid
leakage.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 12-D, "Explosive failure of liquid
system results from inadequacy of system location"; and FT-2 (Temperature
Extremes), 7-M, "Explosion occurs."
3. L2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 16F and 61D.
REMARKS:
Pressure systems as used herein are defined as consisting of vessels, pumps,
tubing, valves, instrumentation, and all hardware that contains liquids or gases
under any pressure above 0.1 iron Hg absolute. Pressure systems which in them-
selves are a potential source of high energy should be protected from exterior
influences that might cause this energy to be released. Therefor, pressure
systems should be adequately separated or shielded from such influences (e.g.,
heat, voltage, leakage) to prevent a hazardous situation from developing.
Also, applies to the following hazard groups: 2. Debris and Meteoroid Impact
4. Electrical
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Explosion	 [NO - 6.8
TITLE:	 Pressure System Safing
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The spacecraft subsystem design should provide the capability of returning any
pressure system to a safe condition in the event of a failure, or miscarriage
of procedural sequence, at any time during operation, test, or asintenance.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 4-M, "Explosive failure of system
normally under pressure results in overpressure and fragmentation."
REMARKS:
Provisions such as a bleed system should be included in any subsystem which
could be subject to inadvertent overpressure to avert malfunctioning, damage, or
possible explosion. Design of such systems also should consider incorporation of
redundant critical items, provisions for isolating portions of the subsystem to
preclude shutdown of the entire system, and substitution of critical functions
when shutdown for corrective action becomes necessary.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Explosion	
[NO • 6.9
TITLE: pressure Tank Relief Protection Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stability and Control System (SCS),
Environmental Control/Life Support System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
High-pressure tanks should have redundant relief valves 7-•ith separate vents.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of propellant
+.ank rupture.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8F, 10F, and 13D.
REMARKS:
Failure of the relief protection for high-pressure tanks could result in tank
rupture and injury to the crew or damage to equipment. To ensure (,ontinuous
relief protection, redundancy should be provided. Each relief device should be
vented separately to prevent one failure from affecting the other. Belief
vents should not be located in the vicinity of ignition sources.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
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HA:.ARD GROUP: Explosion	 [N70 - 6.10
P TLE: Propellant Tank Protection
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Stabil{ ty and Control System (SCS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Propellant tanks should have enough separation, or adequate shielding, to
minimize damage to other tanks in the event one tank ruptures.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (SCS), for potential hazard of propellant
tank rupture.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 3-G, "Failure results from meteoroid
impact"; and 7-K, "Damage occurs during logistic vehicle docking operations."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 12E, 17E and 358.
REMARKS:
A propellant tank could be ruptured through overpressure, meteoroid impact,
damage during docking operations, or damage during cargo or equipment handling.
Wherefore, the propellant tanks should be provided some protection, by location
or use of shielding, from damage by externa. forces. The tanks should also
have adequate separation to preclude a single failure from damaging more than
one tank.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 2. Debris and Meteoroid Impact
5. Equipment Impact
O
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Explosion	 ;.Ip. 6.11
TITLE:
	 Protection of Pressure Vessels
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Subsystem pressure vessels and pressure lines should be located as-remotely as
possible from crew occupied areas, critical equipment, and the primary pressure
shell. In addition, protection should be provided from damage by dropped tools,
slipping wrenches, drills and other unrestrained objects.
REFERENCES:
I. D2 -113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 4-B, "Failure of pressure retention
results from effects of catastrophic subsystem failure."
2. Space Flight Hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969, Hazard No. 138.
REMARKS:
For potentially explosive items not remotely located, consider the use of pro-
tective shields or other protective devices to minimize fragmentation damage.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
3. Decompression/overpressure
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HAZARD GROUP: Explosi .1	 NO
	
6,12
TITLE: Shrouding and Shielding of Pressure Lines
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: &tructures/Mechanical System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Lines carrying pressurized hydrocarbons should be equipped with spray-inhibiting
devices such as shrouding or shielding.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 7-U, "Explosive combination of
materials and environment exists."
REMARKS:
Shrouding or shielding would reduce an accidentally generated spray, which would
support an explosion, to a liquid state which would not support an explosion.
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HAZARD GROUP: Explosion
	 NO. 6,13
TITLE: Water Electrolysis Uni": Cell Reversed Polarity
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE.
Protective devices should be provided to prevent reversing polarity on water
electrolyses unit cells which could result in an explosive H2/02 mixture.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
Of 02.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), 7-U, "Explosive combination of
materials and environment exists."
REMARKS:
Water electrclysis units are used in some EC/LS systems for 02 recovery.
Failure of these units would result in the loss of a source of 02.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 8. Loss of Vital Supplies
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury
	
NO- 7.1
TITLE:
	 Angular Velocity Upper Limit
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: operations, Structures/Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Human factors design envelope parameters should include the establishment of an
upper limit on vehicle angular velocity, when considering an artificial-gravity
enviroLment .
REFERENCES:
1. Preliminary Technical Data for Earth orbiting Space Station, Volume II,
Standards and Criteria, NASA, MSC-EA-R -66-1, November 1966.
REMARKS:
High values of angular velocity would produce Coriolis forces of sufficient
magnitude to exceed the bhysiological and psychological performance limits.
Establishment of tolerable rotation conditions should be in terms of %%n environ-
ment where adequate adaptation can take place to achieve proper performance of
duties.
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 [NO • 7.2
TITLE:
	 Artificial Gravity Limits
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: operations, Structures/Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Human factors design envelope parameters should include th-- establishment of an
upper and lower limit on the level of artificial gravity to be permitted, when
considering an artificial -gravity environment.
REFERENCES:
1. Preliminary Technical Data for Earth orbiting Space Station, Volume II,
Standards and Criteria, NASA, MSC-EA-R -66-1, November 1966.
REMARKS:
In the cited reference, an upper limit on artificial gravity is recommended as
a "one-g" maximum, modified to compensate for Coriolis effects for tangential
walking in the direction of spin. The minimum value recommended is the lowest
value at which man can walk unaided, also modified to compensate for Coriolis
effects.
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 FO. 7.3
TITLE: Bacteriological Monitoring of the Crew
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All crew members should be monitored at regular intervals for gross qualitative
and quantitative bacteriological changes.
REFERENCES:
1. Bceing Document D2-90254, Summary Report--Project CREST (Closed Respiratory
Environmental System Test), September 1962.
2. Manned Environmental System Asses6ment, NASA Contract NASw 656, May 1964.
REMARKS:
Distinct bacteriological qualitative and quantitative changes that could affect
the health of the crew have been observed in studies such as the two referenced
above. These changes appear to be caused by:
1. Relatively small and confined living quarters.
2. Bacteriological cross fertilization between inhabitants of a confined space.
3. High and efficient filtering capacity provided by the ECS and other filtering
devices.
4. Use of bacteria-killing devices such as the possible use of ultraviolet
sterilization means for air and potable water.
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	
F-0--
	 7.4
TITLE:
	 Bodily Injuries: Cuts, Contusions, Fractures, Sprains, Etc.
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Complete human enpaneering an-Llysis and all possible safeguards should be
applied in design, construction, and maintenance to minimize, if not eliminate,
any possibility of injury t,) personnel during normal operations, repair and
maintenance activities, and in emergency conditions.
REFERENCES:
1. NASA CR-1205 (II), Compendium of Human Responses to the Aerospace
Environment, Volume II, (1968), pages 7-212 to 221.
2. NASA SP-86, Medical Aspects of an Orbiting Research Laboratory, pages 15,
31-2.
REMARKS:
A design objective should be to make the space station accident-proof. This
means that work and living spaces, tools, and equipment should be designed and
thorough], reviewed during the design, teeting, and at all stages of construc-
tion and op-ration, to eliminate hazards to personnel. Provisions should be
made for convenience and safety during all maintenance and repair as well as
during normal operations. All tasks and procedures, and all training manuals
and routines, sh.- Lld be reviewed for hazard potential and revised if necessary.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 5. Equipment Impact
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 NO• 7.5
TITLE: gas, Chemical and Thermal
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr All
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Hazard warnings, interlocks, and other protective devices should be installed
and the crews indoctrinated in the hazards, precautions, and applicable first
aid measures wherever burn hazards exist.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-1.13070-10, FT-2 (Temperature Extremes), I-D, "Injury results from direct
expoisure to high temperature."
2. nsk. sr-86, Medical Aspects of an Orbiting Research Laboratory, pages 15,
31; (1966).
3 NASA ;R-1205 (I and III), Compendium of Human Responses to the Aerospace
Environment, Volumes I and III; pages 3-57; 5-6 to 9, 12, 13; 6-108 and 9;
13-45 ,'to 55; ( 1968) •
REMARKS:
The space station should be made as nearly accident-proof as possible and crew
members should be trained to avoid accidents and to minimize the consequences of
any accidents that do occur. A number of fires have occurred it space cabin
simulator tests, and hospital oxygen chambers. Every feasible effort should be
made to prevent a major tragedy as well as to minimize lesser ,accidents.
Applies also to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
4. Electrical
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury
	 FNO • 7.6
TITLE: Communicable Disease Control
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Environmental Control/Life
Support, Operations, Structures/Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Provision should be made for isolation of suspected or actua l commi.._aable
disease cases from the rest of the crew for observation, trea' :ment, and possible
evacuation.
REFERENCES:
1. NASA Sp-86, Medical Aspects of an Orbiting Research laboratory, pages 33-39,
(1966).
2. D2-113070-6,
 Supporting Analyses, Section 6, "Human Requirements."
REMARKS:
Communicable disease in space is unlikely with the medical screening and
quarantine that crews undergo. It is, however, not impossible. With relatively
minor modification, a multi-compartment space station can be designed so one
or more compartments can be isolated (as in hospital) and attendants can use
hospital -type procedures (wash-up, linen disposal, etc.) to avoid spreading
infection to other compartments. The facilities could be similar ( though
requirements are not as stringent) to those for returning interplanetary
explorers and might even serve for that purpose if mission times coincide.
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HAZARD GRO,.P: Illness and Injury	 NO• 7.7
TITLE:	 Compartment Orientation within Artificial-Gravity Environment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, Structures/Mechanical
F
UIDELINE:
of rotating spacecraft should be such that the direction of • major traffic
 parallel to V'e vehicle spin axis.
REFERENCES:
1. Preliminary Technical Data for Eexth Orbiting Space Station, Volume II,
Standards and Criteria, MSC-EA-R -66-1, November 1966.
REMARKS:
The Coriolis force in a rotating station will tend to hamper crew movement and
may adversely affect the crew's physical and mental health. Routing all possf.ble
traffic movement in a direction parallel to the axis of rotation will result in
minimizing the effects of the Coriolis force.
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 NO 7.6
TME: Crew Restrictions During Internal Hazardous Operations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUN{;TI0NS'r Experiments, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Only those crew members necessary to the conduct of the operation should be
permitted access to areas in which hazardous operations are being conducted.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 3, "Analysis of Operations";
Section 5, "Traffic Pattern Analysis"; and Section 6, "Human Requirements."
REMARKS:
Certain operations or experiments will require use of or exposure to unusually
hazardous conditions, e.g., high voltages, high or low temperatures, low
pressure, radiation, and the like. To minimize crew exposure to these hazards,
only the minimum number of crew necessary to the work should be allowed in the
work area.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination
2. Decompression/Overpressure
9. Radiation
10. Temperature Extremes
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 NO• 7.9
TITLE:
	 Death of Crew Members
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Environmental Control/Life
Support System, Structures/Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Procedures and equipment should be available for use in the event of death
of a crew member.
REFERENCES:
i. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyser, Section 6, "Human Requirements."
REMARKS:
The cause of death should be established as quickly as possible and quarantine
provisions invoked if infectious disease is diagnosed. A gross autopsy may be
performed on-board if qualified personnel are among the crew or, preferably,
after evacuation of the body to Earth. To prevent or reduce the threat of
contamination, the body should be sealed in plastic and chilled, or treated by
other suitable means, to await transport to Earth. In the event that buria:
in space is permitted and desirable, tissue samples to complete the autopsy
may be required for histological examination.
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury 	 NO. 7.10
TITLE: Death of Experimental Plants and Animals
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Experiments
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Procedures and equipment should be provided for the preservation or disposal
of the remains of deceased experimental plants or animals.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, "Human Requirements."
2. Candidate Experiment Program for Manned Space.Stations, NASA, May.1969.
REMARKS:
It is expected that normal experiment equipment and procedures would be
adequate to accommodate the requirements for disposition imposed by the routine
deaths of experimental plants and animals. In the case of unanticipated death,
however, provision should be made for prompt determination of the cause of
death and, if the cause is one which could adversely affect the crew, for the
isolation and/or disposal of the remains in a mariner which safeguards the crew.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 NO. 7.11
TITLE:
	 Emotional Disturbances
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The program of selection, training, mission support, physical conditioning,
daily activities, and recreation should insure that crew members remain
confident in the mission and their roles in it.
REFERENCE.
1... NASA SP-86, Medical Aspects of an Orbiting Research Laboratory, pages 33-39,
(1966).
2. NASA CR-1205 (I, II and III), Compendium of Human Responses to the Aerospace
Environment, Volumes I, II and III, pages 3-51, 81 to 83; 7-5, 48; 16-77 to
96, (1968).
REMARKS:
Emotional disturbances may be caused by anger, fear, anxiety, frustration, etc.,
and may vary from a mild, transient response of no particular consequence tc
impaired performance, irrational behavior, and even to psychosis in extreme
cases. Even when performance and behavior are not affected, physiological
changes may betray stress. Among the milder of these are changes in heart
action, circulatory and gastrointestinal disturbances, lowered resistance to
infection or allergens, and altered sensitivity to drugs. If prolonged, these
conditions can lead to more severe physiological disturbances and impaired
performance. Properly selected and well motivated people who have realistic
confidence in the mission and in their ability to carry it out should be good
risks in this regard.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 LNO - 7.12
TITLE:
	 Gastrointestinal and Urinary Tract Disorders
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Environmental Control/Llf e
Support SystemSAFETY. GUIDELINE:
Adequate nutritional and fluid intakes should be established, and the crew
monitored to ensure that they are maintained, to guard against gastrointestinal
and urinary tract disturbances.
REFERENCES:
1. NASA CR-1205 (III), Compendium of Human Responses '.;o the Aerospace
Environment, Volume III, Sections 14 and 15, (1968).
2. NASA Sp-86, Medical Aspects of an Orbiting , Research Laboratory, pages 33-39,(1966).
REMARKS:
Susceptibility to these disturbances varies markedly with emotional state.
This includes susceptibility to infections as well as discomforts, functional
disorders, indigestion, ulcers, and kidney stones. Adequate diet and fluid
intake are primary considerations. Electrolyte balance should be maintained and
urine volume should be kept above the pljsiological minimum to prevent crystal
or stone formation in the kidneys. A relaxing environment for eating will also
contribute to good health.
0
1
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CD2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury 	 FO,	 7.13
TITLE:
	 Hazardous Materials Accessibility
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: All
WETY GUIDELINE:
Provisions should be made to prevent unauthorized access to and use of
hazardous materials, e.g., drugs, poisons, nuclear materials, and the like.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, "Human Requirements."
REMARKS:
The operational and experimental programs of the space station/base will require
significant amounts of hazardous materials to be on-board. Use of these
materials by unauthorized persons or for unauthorized uses could pose a hazard
to the Individuals concerned through direct injury and to the crew as a whole
through contamination.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury
	 NO • 7.14
TITLE: Health and Safety Officer(S) Training
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The responsible health and safety crew member(s) should be specifically
trained in matters related to the health and safety of the crew.
REFERENCES:
1. MIL S-38130, Safety Engineering of Systems and Associated Subsystems and
Equipment, General Requirements, March 1967.
REMARKS:
Special training should be given to crew members who will have the responsi-
bility for the health and safety of personnel in the spacecraft. This
responsibility includes:
1. Housekeeping aspects of the spacecraft.
2. Safe operating procedures.
3. Utilization of personnel protective equipment and clothing.
4. Identification and preliminary diagnosis of injury and disease.
5. Prognosis of illnesses.
6. Decision-making regarding quarantine requirements.
7. Administration of treatment to inured or ill crew members which includes
the use of medicines and drugs.
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury NO. 7.15
TITLE: irrational Crew Member Restraint
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A means should be provided for restraint and control of irrational crew
members.
REFERENCES:
I. D2-113070 -6,
 Supprting Analyses, Section 6, "Human Requirements."
REMARKS:
In view of the procedures for selection, training, indoctrination,and motivation
of space crews, the probability of a crew member becoming irrational does not
appear very great. Tb.e possibility does exist, however, particularly as space
missions become of longer duration and crews become larger. Means of restraint,
such as a straight ,jacket, would not seem to impose much penalty and need be
effective only for such time as is necessary to evacuate the crew member to
Earth.
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 FO- 7.16
TITLE: Medical Emergencies
APPLICvBLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Environmental Control Life
Support System, Operations, Structures/Mechanical Systems
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The crew shuuld be prepared, the spacecraft equipped and the jround complex
organized to cope with medical emergencies so there is minimum hazard to crew
members and minimum interference with the mission.
REFERENCES:
i. IJa SP-86, Medical Aspects of an Orbiting Research Laboratory, pages 33-39,(1966).
2. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of crew injury
or illness.
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Aagraa, Propositions 22D, 23D, 69J and 70J.
REMARKS:
Although the probability of illness will be low due to the intensive preventive
medicine progiw for crew members, medical emergencies can occur, and might
needlessly disrupt station operations if contingency plans have not been made.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination3. Decumpressiun/OverpressureS. Equipment Impact
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 NO, 7;17
TITLE:
	 Protective Clothing
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Crew members should be provided and wear a coverall type garment made of
material which will neither burn nor melt.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Section 7, "Meteoroid Penetration."
REMARKS:
One of the effects of a meteoroid penetration would be an inte9se, though short
duration, heat pulse having a flux rate as high as 1300 BTU/ft -sec. A non-
flammable, non-melting garment would provide some protection from flash burns
from this source and from other sources as well.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 2. Debris and Meteoroid Impact
6. Explosion
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 NO- 7.18
TITLE: Quarantine Regulations
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
All approved quarantine regulations should be enforced by the Health and
Safety Officer with the concurrence and backing of the spacecraft commander.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -6, Supporting Analyses, Section 6, "Human Requirements."
REMARKS:
Determination of contagious or infectious pathological conditions that in
the opinion of the Health and Safety Officer require isolation and quarantine
should be executed and enforced for the protection of other members of the
crew. The decision to terminate the isolation imposed will be made by the
Health and Safety Officer.
ni
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: I imess and Injury	 NO. 7.19
TITLE: Radial Traffic in Artificial -Gravity Environment
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONSr operations, Structures/Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Design of rotating spacecraft should be such that radial traffic is kept to a
minimum.
REFERENCES:
1. Preliminary Technical Data for Earth Orbiting Space Stations, Volume II,
Standards and Criteria, NASA, MSC-EA-R-66-1, November 1966.
REMARKS:
In a rotating spacecraft the velocity of each point along the radius varies with
the radius. This requires that crew members moving radially must adjust ;heir
apparent direction of movement to compensate for velocity changes, as well as
adjusting the effort required to compensate for the grwrity changer. Conflicting
sensory impulses from these sources, together with those from eyes and ears, may
adversely affect the crew members' health and ability to perform necessary tasks
safely.
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Illness and InJury	 ENO - 7.20
TITLE: Radiation Casualty Evacuation
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
In the event of severe exposure of a crew member to ionizing radiation, evacua-
tion to Barth may be desired. If so, it should be scheduled during the latent
period, that is, after first symptoms, such as nausea, disappear and before
the onset of disability.
REFERENCES:
1. Bioastronautics Data Book, NASA sp-3006, pages 145-6, (1964).
2. Compendium of fiuman Responses to the Aerospace Environment, NASA CR-1205 (I),
Volume I, pages 3-46 to 67.
REMARKS:
Acute radiation exposure roeater than 50r will probably produce gastrointestinal
or nonspecific symptoms (nausea, etc.) 1&sting for a day or so, followed by
blood disorders. Even with doses several i.imes this large, an apparently
symptom-free period of several days usually comes between the initial reaction
and the subsequent longer period of radiation illness. Radiation exposure
victims can be evacuated most easily during this time.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 9. Radiation
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 I NO• 7.21
TITLE: Rotation Radius Lower Limit
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations, Structures/Mechanical
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Human factors design snvelope parameters should include the establishment of a
lover limit on the rotation radius, when considering an artificial-gravity
?r.t^lronment .
REFERENCES:
1. Preliminary Technical Data for Earth Orbiting Space Station, Volume II,
Standards and Criteria, NASA, MSC-RA-R-66-1, November 1969-
REMARKS:
Artificial gravity produced by a rotating vehicle results in a gradient along
the local radius vector. Thus, a man will experience a head-to-foot gravity
gradient that may be expressed as a percentage of the centrifugal forces acting
at the man's foot.
The lower limit of the radius should be based upon a tolerable gravity gradient.
(Past evidence on man's tolerance to this gradient has established this
percentage at a difference of about 1
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 FNO - 7.22
TITLE: Sanitation Standards
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System, Environmental Control./Life
Support System, Operations, Structures/Mechanical System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The living and personal service quarters and all areas where food, potable
water, and waste products are handled should be designed for easy cleaning and
sanitation so that reasonable sanitary standards can be maintained without
excessive expenditure of time, energy, or supplies.
REFERENCES:
1. NASA SP-86, Medical Aspects of an Orbiting Space Station, pages 33-39,(1966)-
2. NASA CR-1205 (I and III), Compendium of Human Responses to the Aerospace
Environment, Volumes I and III, pages 3-43 to 46, 53, 64, 66, 81; 5-12;13-10, 92; 15-12, 13; 16-21, (1968).
REMARKS:
Except in the case of infectious diseases or of massive infections, which seem
very unlikely, stringent hygienic measures are of questionable desirability.
General standards of cleanliness and sanitation siailar to those for food
handling establishments should prove adequate for the space station. The
human body and its environment have large and varied microbial populations to
which the body is adapted. Sanitary measures affect some organisms more than
others. Stringent sanitation can thus cause shifts in the microbial population
to which the body must readjust, sometimes becoming ill in the process.
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C
HAZARD GROUP: Illness and Injury	 NO- 7.23
TITLE: Work Station Position for Artificial-Gravity Station
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE.
Crew lit •ing and working stations should be oriented such that, during normal
activity, the lateral axis through the crew member's ears is parallel to the
axis of spin. In conjunction with this guidc.l-_ne, the work console instruments
and controls should be designed so that left-right head rotations and up-down
arm motions are minimized.
REFERENCES:
1. Preliminary Technical Data for Earth Orbiting Space Station, Volume II,
Standards and Criteria, NASA, MSC-EA-R -66-1, November 66.
REMARKS:
The changing forces to which man's body is subjected while moving within the
spacecraft are also applied to the canals of the inner ear. The changing
gratiity forces and Coriolis forces which result from movement inside the
spacecraft or due to movement, rotation, or cocking of the head, act on the
inner ear. Such stimulation is conducive to canal sickness (motion sickness),
and thus can result in a deterioration of human performance and comfort.
}
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. aO^F1u D,Dz-11307as
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 NO. 8. 1
TITLE:
	 Air Circulation
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/ Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Air circulation systems should be designed to provide continuous air circula-
tion that will preclude the existence of stagnant air pockets within inhabited
areas.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/ISS), for potential hazard of
atmosphere contamination.
2. Space Flight hazards Catalog, MSC 00134, September, 1969, Hazard No. 37.
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 10F, 15K, 33E, 43F, 44B, 44C, 45B,
and 48H.
REMARKS:
Adequate and continuous circulation of the cabin air is necessary to preclude
accumulation of contaminated air pockets, ensure continuous removal of air
contaminants, and provide cooling for personnel and equipment. A visusl alarm
should also be provided to warn the crew if the air circulation decreases below
a specified limit. Air flow monitors should be located downstream of filters
or other equipment which could restrict or block the airflow if not operating
properly. To ensure continuous circulation of cabin air, built-in redundancy
should be provided for air circulation equipment. If, as recommended in
Guideline 8.9, there are multiple EC/LSS's and the crew can occupy another
compartment while the malfunctioning air circulation equipment is being repaired,
then this redundancy may not be necessary. All cabin air circulating fans should
be protected from Jamming by debris floating in zero-gravity conditions.
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 NO.	 8.2
TITLE:
	 Airlock Oxygen Monitor
APPLICABLE SUBSYS1fMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Oxygen usage monitors should be provided to detect abnormal oxygen use during
pressurized airlock operations.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -11, Subsystems Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of no
airlock capability.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 18D and 42D.
REMARKS:
Excessive loss of oxygen because of airlock or associated equipment failure can
probably not be detected unless the airlock is pressurized. Therefore, a means
of monitoring oxygen flow or usage in an airlock should be provided. This
indication should be closely monitored whenever the airlock is pressurized.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 3. Decompression/Overpressure
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 FO - 8.3
TITLE: Airlock Suit Loop Connections
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Structures/Mechanical (S/M), Crew System,
Environmental Control/Life Support System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Suit loop connections should be provided in each airlock for the maximum
number of crew members planned to occupy the airlock at any one time.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (S/M), for potential hazard of no airlock
capability.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 331•
REMARKS:
Emergency situations may arise during EVA wherein a PLSS function is degraded
or lost and corrective action is required in less time than available for the
complete airlock entry cycle. The proper corrective action should be provided
by including pressure suit connections that are accessible from inside the
airlock. These connections may also be used during normal entry and exit to
conserve PISS capability. Consideration should also be given to the possibility
of using these connections and long umbilicals to enable nearby EVA without
requiring a PISS.
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 NO' 8.4
TITLE:	 Autonomous Operation of Suit Loop
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
EC LSS
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The suit loop should have the capability of operating independently from the
rest of the EC/LSS.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of 'loss of
suit loop.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 331 and 341.
REMARKS:
Since the suit loop may be used when the EC/LSS is not operating, it is neces-
sary that the suit loop operation not be dependent upon satisfactory operation
of the EC/LSS.
- 
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 [NO •
	 8.5
TITLE: Continuous Control of Cabin Pressure
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A capability should be provided for ensuring continuous control of the cabin
pressure within specified limits for crew safety.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/113S) ., for potential hazard of loss
of cabin pressure.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 4-C, "Failure (of pressure retention)
results from loss of subsystem function."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 42H.
REMARKS:
Controlling the cabin pressure within specified limits is required for crew
safety. To ensure continuous control of cabin pressure, even if the primary
control malfunctions,,ctive redundancy should be provided for cabin pressure
regulators. As an additional backup to parallel redundancy, a capability to
operate the necessary valves manually to control cabin pressure could be provided.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 3. Decompression/Overpressure
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital
TITLE: Crew Shower Failure Prot
APPLICABLE SUBSYSYEMS/FUNCTIO
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Crew showers, or other means, u
environment should include prot
REFERENCES:
1. D2-13_3070-11, Subsystem Ana
or illness.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram,
REMARKS:
Crew shower designs for weightl
air stream to ensure proper air
around the mouth and nostrils.
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off of the shower water if loss
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies 	 FO - 8.7
TITLE:
	 Emergency Life Support Provisions
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Crew System (CS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Readily available individual emergency life support equipment for the maximum
number of crew members planned to occupy a given compartment at one time
should be provided in that compartment.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazards of loss
of cabin pressure and atmosphere contamination.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 5 -C, "Emergency equipment is non-
existent at time required."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8C, 44B, 44C and 48C.
REMARKS:
The safety of crew members in a compartment could be compromised if the atmos-
phere becomes uninhabitable due to low pressure or atmosphere contamination.
The crew may not be able to leave the compartment in time to avoid the emer-
gency, or it may be necessary to perform some tasks under the unfavorable
atmospheric condition. Therefore, emergency life suppor* provisions should be
available to each member of the crew that may be in the compartment. This
may require more than one type of life support provision; e.g., oxygen masks
connected to an oxygen supply for use in contaminated atmospheres, or full
p ressure suits for use in a compartment where the pressure is too low for
crew safety.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination3. Decompression/Overpressure
10. Temperature Extremes
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 NO- 8.8
TITLE:
	 Emergency Pressurization Oxygen Supply
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/SS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A separate completely independent oxygen supply should. be provided for emer-
gency pressurization.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), of potential hazard of loss of
cabin pressure.
2. D2-1130't0-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 5-C, "Emergency equipment is non-
existent at time required."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 331•
REMARKS:
During long-duration missions, an emergency situation may occur in a depressur-
ized compartment where it is necessary to repressurize rapidly in the interest
of crew safety. A separate and independent oxygen supply should be provided
for this purpose and it should be capable of rapidly pressurizing a compartment
to the oxygen pressure level required for crew survival.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 3. Decompression/Overpressure
-lf0-
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies
	 FNO - 8.9
TITLE: Environmental Control/Life Support Systems (EC/LSS) Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A space station should include at least two independent EC/LSS's located in
separate compartments. These systems should be capable of supplying the atmos-
pheric requirements even with one system inoperative.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of cabin pressure.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-E, "Decompression results from
failure of spacecraft pressure retention."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8C, 34C and 42H.
REMARKS:
A space station should be able to sustain major damage to a compartment or the
equipment located therein without total loss cf EC/LSS capabili-4y. One means
of accomplishing this is to provide at least two completely independent
EC/LSS's, which are located in separate compartments to minimize the possibility
of damage to more than one system simultaneously.
C
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 [No • 8.10
TITLE:
	 Interlocks for Equipment with Critical Operating Ranges
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Envir amental Control/Life Support System
(EC" 3S)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Equipment that cannct safely perform its function in a system unless it is
operating within a specific operating range, e.g., temperature or pressure
limits, should have interlocks incorporated to preclude its use in the system
when it is not operating in the proper range.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of atmos-
phere contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 6B and 9C.
REMARKS:
Some equipment used in space station systems may require that it operate within
specific temperature, pressure, or other parameter limits in order to perform its
function safely; e.g., catalytic burners have a minimum temperature operating
limit. This equipment should incorporate interlocks in its circuits to prevent
their operation in the system when the equipment critical operating parameters
are not within specified limits.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies
	 [NO • 8.11
TITLE:
	 Oxygen Leak Isolation
A'PLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Oxygen storage and distribution systems should have provisions to isolate
Sources of oxygen leakage.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/ISS), for potential hazard of loss of
oxygen.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-D, "Decompression eventuates from
loss of spacecraft pressure supply."
3. D2-113070 .9,
 Logic Diagram, Proposition 15K.
REMARKS:
Once excessive oxygen usage has been identifies'. it will be necessary to shut
off the supply of oxygen to the leakage point until the situation has been
corrected. To effectively control as much of the system as possible, an oxygen
shut-off device should be located as close to the oxygen supply sources as
practicable.
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies
	 [NO. 8. 12
TITLE:
	 Oxygen Quantity and Usage
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/ISS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A visual and audible alarm should be provided to warn of excessive oxygen use
rates and low oxygen quantity. This alarm should be provided both in the
affected space station compartment and ^t the command and control center(s). 	
I
t
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS) for potential hazard of loss of
oxygen.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1, (Decompression), 1-D, "Decompression eventuates from
loss of spacecraft pressure supply."
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 15K and 48H.
REMARKS:
The space station crew should be warned of excessive usage of oxygen suppli:-s
which, if allowed to continue, would affect crew safety. Procedures should
also be developed for correcting excessive use of oxygen. Some causes of
excessive oxygen usage to be considered are leakage from tanks, valves, and
plumbing; regulator failures; and vehicle-to-space leakage.
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 FO 	 8.13
TITLE:	 Oxygen Regulation Component Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/ISS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Active redundancy should be provided for components which control and regulate
the cabin atmosphere oxygen partial pressure.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/ISS), for potential hazard of loss
of oxygen.
2. D2-113070-10 2 FT-1, (Decompression), 4-C, "Failure of pressure retention
results from loss of subsystem function."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 1OF and 44C.
REMARKS:
The oxygen partial pressure of the atmosphere in all inhabited compartments of
the space station is critical to crew safety. To ensure continuous operation
of the oxygen partial pressure regulation function, even if the primary
regulating device fails, an alternate regulating device should be provided.
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vi.tai Supplies	 FO _ 8.14TITLE:
	 Oxygen Storage 'Tanks Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Oxygen supplies should be stored in more than one tank or other storage device.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS) for potential hazard of loss of
oxygen.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-D, "Decompression eventuates from
loss of spacecraft pressure supply.
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 331•
REMARKS:
Since oxygen is vital to life support of the crew, the oxygen supply system
should be designed so that a single failure will not result in a total loss of
the oxygen supply. Consideration should be given to locating the oxygen tanks
with sufficient separation or adequate shielding so that disintegration of one
tank will not affect another. Determination of the number and sizes of the
oxygen tanks to be used should involve consideration of the resupply require-
ments. If oxygen tanks are to be exchanged during resupply, the size of the
tanks may dictate additional requirements for the handling and transf.:r of the
oxygen tanks from the resupply vehicle to the space station.
Also applies to the following hazard groups: 1. Contamination6. Explosion
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 NO- 8.15
TITLE: Oxygen Usage Manual Control
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The oxygen partial pressure in the atmosphere of pressurized compartments should
be capable of manual control.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss of
oxygen.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-D, "Decompression eventuates from
loss of spacecraft pressure supply."
3• D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 48F.
REMARKS:
In case of failure of the automatic control for the cabin atmosphere oxygen
partial pressure, the crew should have the capability to manually control and
regulate oxygen partial pressure until automatic coutrol can be restored.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies
	 [NO• 8.16
TITLE: PLSS Emergency Backup
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Environmental Control/
Life Support System, Operations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
An emergency backup capability should be provided for PUSS used with the pressure
suits.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of EVA
equipment failure.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-F, "Decompression eventuates from
loss of pressure suit supply."
3. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 8C, 18D and 331.
REMARKS:
There is the possibility of a PLSS failure occurring to a crewman on EVA which
could prevent his return to a safe haven, such as an airlock. Therefore, an
independent, emergency life support system of sufficient duration to allow
return to the space station should be available.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 NO-	 8.17
TITLE:
	
Pressure Leak Detectors
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS), Structures/Mechanical System (S/M)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Cabin pressure leak detection sensors should be strategically located In the
space station to detect any leakage in the structural pressure shell or pressure
:teals of the space station. The sensor should activate an alarm within the
affected compartment and also at the command and control center(s).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of cabin pressure.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-J, "Failure of pressure retention
results from failure of structural matrix."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8C, 18E and 34C.
REMARKS:
If a total pressure loss alarm is activated or if a pressure leak is not large
enough to activate an alarm, it will be necessary to know if leakage is occurring
through the pressure shell or pressure seals, and the location of the leakage,
so that appropriate corrective action may be taken.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 3. Decompression/overpressure
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies
	
NO 8.18
TITLE:
	 Pressure Relief Valve Repair Procedures
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A means should be provided to bypass or inactivate failed cabin pressure relief
valves.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss of
cabin pressure.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 4-C, "Failure (of pressure retention)
results from loss of subsystem function."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 8C.
REMARKS:
A failed-open cabin pressure relief valve could result in the cabin pressure
decreasing below the limits normally specified for crew safety, and/or in
excessive loss of cabin atmosphere. This indicates a need to inactivate or
bypass the operation of the failed valve until the failure can be corrected.
Two means which could be considered to accomplish this function are: redundant
relief valves in series, or a capability to close an open relief velve manually.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 3. Decompression/Overpressure
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies
	
F70--8.19
TITLE:
	 Pressure Suit/PISS Atmosphere Composition
APPLICABLE SL:"SYSIEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Environmental Control/
Life Support System EC LSSOperations
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Consideration should be given to using a pressure suit /PLSS combination that is
designed to operate at pressures and gas compositions which will ensure a safe
and rapid transition from the space station atmosphere.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems gnalysis ( CS), for potential hazard of EVA
equipment failure.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 44C and 44E.
REMARKS:
Present pressure suit /PLSS designs gener-^y use a much lower suit pressure and
a different atmosphere composition than is planned for the space station. This
situation will require a period of denitrogenization by breathing 100 percent 02
at space station pressures before transition to the lower space suit pressure
in order to avoid the possibility of "bends." If the two atmospheres were more
compatible the denitrogenation requirement could be decreased or eliminated with
a proportionate increase in crew safety.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 7. Illness and Injury
- 171 -
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 NO,	 8.20
TITLE: Pressure Suit/PISS CO2 Monitor
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Environmental Control/
Life Support System (EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A visual and/or audible alarm should be provided to a pressure-suited crew
member to warn him of excessive CO2 concentration in the suit atmosphere.
This alarm should also be provided at an EVA monitoring console.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of EVA
equipment failure.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 18D and 45E.
REMARKS:
The CO2 removal capability of the PLSS is of limited duration. Therefore, it
is important that a person using the PLSS and pressure suit be aware of excessive
levels of CO2 which could affect his safety. Sufficient warning should be given
to allow the crew member to reach a safe haven. Procedures shoW.d also be
established to ensure that a crew member using a PISS knows what _02 removal
capability is available.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
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D2-Ii3070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 NO• 8.21
TITLE: Pressure Suit/PLSS Oxygen Usage
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Environmental Control/
Life Support System (EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A visual and/or audible alarm should be provided to a pressure suited crew
member to warn him of excessive oxygen use rates and '.ow oxygen quantity for
the PLSS. This alarm should also be provided at an EVA monitoring console.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of EVA
equipment failure.
D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 2-B, "Loss of pressure suit pressure
retention results from suit assembly failure."
D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 15K.
REMARKS:
The PLSS used with the pressure suit has a limited duration capability. There-
fore, it is important that a person using this equipment be aware of excessive
usage rate of the oxygen supply and also of a low oxygen quantity. This should
allow the crew member to reach a safe haven before the supply is depleted oz
to take any necessary corrective action. Procedures should also be established
to ensure that a crew member using a PISS knows what oxygen capability is
available.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 3. Decompression/Overpressure
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 ENO- 8.22
TITLE:
	 Pressure Suit/PLSS Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Environmental ^--itrol/
Life Support System (EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Redundant or spare pressure suits and PISS's should be provided in each
separately inhabited compartment of the space station.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of EVA
equipment failure.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 8C, 1OF and 331.
REMARKS:
Emergency life support provisions in each inhabited compartment of the space
station could include pressure suits and PISS's. To ensure availability of
operating equipment to all occupants of a compartment, a certain number of
redundant (spare) pressure suits and PLSS's should be provided.
t
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	
Fo -
	
8.23
TITLE:	 Pressure Suit Temperature and Humidity Monitoring
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Crew System (CS), Environmental Control/
Life Support System (EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A visual and/or audible alarm should be provided to a pressure-suited crew
member to warn him of out-of-tolerance temperature or humidity levels in the
suit atmosphere. This alarm should also be provided at an EVA monitoring
console.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (CS), for potential hazard of EVA
equipment failure.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 18D, 44B and 44D.
REMARKS:
The PLSS used with pressure suits is designed to keep the suit atmosphere
within certain temperature and humidity ranges. These ranges are specified
to ensure a suit environment that will effectively sustain a person during
EVA. If these limits are exceeded the performance of the suited crew member
may be degraded enough to endanger his safety.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies 	 NO• 8.24
TITLE:
	 Suit Loop Checkout
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Procedures should be developed for a checkout of suit loop operation at regularly
scheduled intervals.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of suit loop.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-F, "Decompression eventuates from
loss of pressure suit supply"; and 1-G, ".Decompression results from failure
of pressure suit pressure retention."
3. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Proposition 10G.
REMARKS:
The suit loop is usually used only in emergency situations as a backup to the
EC/LSS. Since it is not used regularly and must be operational when needed,
the suit loop operation must be checked out periodically to ensure that it will
be available when required.
- 
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cD2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 [NO •	 8.25
TITLE: Suit Loop Components Maintenance
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS )
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
The suit loop should have the capability for easy isolation of, accessibility
to and replacement of faulty components.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss of
suit loop.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-F, "Decompression eventuates from
failure of pressure suit supply."
3. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 10G and 48F.
REMARKS:
Since operation of the suit loop is critical to the safety of the crew^the
system should be designed and the equipment installed so that a faulty compo-
nent can be readily identified and replaced before the redundant unit mal-
functions.
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HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies
	 Fo.	 8.26
TITLE:
	 Suit Loop Component Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
EC LSS
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Redundancy should be provided for equipment which is essential to the operation
of the suit loop.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS) for potential hazard of loss
of suit loop.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-F, "Decompression eventuates from
failure of pressure suit supply."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 10F.
REMARKS:
The suit loop is usually used only , in emergencies as a backup to the EC/LSS.
Therefore, when its operation is needed, it is imperative that the suit loop
perform continuously and satisfactorily. To ensure continuous operation of
the suit loop,redundancy should be provided for the critical equipment in this
system.
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D2-113070-5
c
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 F-0 - 8.27
TITLE:	 Suit Loop Manual Control
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A capability for manually controlling operation of the equipment used in the
suit loop should be considered.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of suit loop.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-F, "Decompression eventuates from
loss of pressure suit supply."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 18E and 27E.
REMARKS:
Situations may arise where normal control of the suit loop is inoperative and
it would be advantageous to have the capability to manually control the suit
loop operation until normal control can be re-established.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies 	 NO. 8.28
TITLE:	 Suit Loop Outlets
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Readily available suit loop outlets for the maximum number of crew members
planned to occupy a given compartment at one time should be provided in that
compartment.
REFERENCES:
I. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Anatysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of suit loop.
2. D2-113070-10 1 FT-1 (Decompression), 1-F, "Decompression eventuates from
failure of pressure suit supply."
3• D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Proposition 45B.
REMARKS:
Emergency life support provisions in each inhabited compartment could include
suit loop outlets which should be available in sufficient quantity that they
can be used by all crew members that may be in the compartment. There should
be a few extra (redundant) outlets provided to accommodate malfunctions or
unanticipated crew members.
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 FNO.
	 8.29
TITLE: Suit Loop Pressure Monitor
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System(EC/ISS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
While the suit loop is in operation, the suit loop pressure should be monitored
-cntinuously and a warning provided to the crew if the pressure deviates from
prescribed limits.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of suit loop.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-F, "Decompression eventuates from
failure of pressure suit supply."
3. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Proposition 44E.
REMARKS:
Maintaining the suit loop pressure within prescribed limits is essential to
proper operation of the suit loop. The crew should be warned of any deviation
from these limits so that they can take the necessary corrective action.
- 181 -
D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies 	 [NO- 8.30
TITLE:	 Warning System--Oxygen Pressure
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
A visual and audible warning and alarm system should be provided to warn of
cabin oxygen partial pressure which is not within prescribed limits for crew
safety. This alarm should be provided both in the affected space station
compartment and at the command and control center(s).
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of loss
of oxygen.
2. D2-113070-10, FT-1 (Decompression), 1-E, "Decompression results from failure
of spacecraft pressure retention."
3. D2-113070 -9,
 Logic Diagram, Propositions 44C, 48H and 481.
REMARKS:
The space station crew should be warned of out-of-tolerance oxygen partial
pressures in any pressurized compartment which, if allowed to continue, could
affect crew safety. Procedures should also be developed for controlling the
space station atmosphere after this warning has been received.
Also ap;, _Iies to the following hazard group: 3. Decompression/Overpressure
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies	 [NO • 8.31
TITLE: Water Contamination Control Prccedures
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Procedures and equipment should be provided for reclaiming or disposing of
contaminated water, and restoring the equipment to accep-^able cleanliness
criteria.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070 -11, Subsystem Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of water
contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 30D and 76C.
REMARKS:
If the water supply becomes contaminated the crew should be able to take the
necessary corrective action to restore system cleanliness. Therefore, emergency
procedures should be provided for reclaiming the water, if possible, or
disposing of the water, eliminating the source of contamination, and restoring
system cleanliness.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies 	 Fo. 8.32
TITLE: Water Sterilization Equipment Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(ECASS )
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Redundancy should be provided for equipment which is essential to maintaining
acceptable sterility of the water supply.
REFERENCES:
I. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of water
contamination.
2. D2-113070 -9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 1OF and 30D.
REMARKS:
Water is used for a number of functions associated with crew life support and
habitability. The sterility requirements for the water will differ depending
upon its intended use. dater used for drinking and food preparation must be
of good quality or crew illness may result. Therefore, to ensure continuous
operation of the sterilization function for critical water supplies, redundancy
should be provided for this equipment.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
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D2-113070-5
HAZARD GROUP: Loss of Vital Supplies
	 [NO • 8.33
TITLE: Water Storage Tanks Redundancy
APPLICABLE SUBSYSTEMS/FUNCTIONS: Environmental Control/Life Support System
(EC/LSS)
SAFETY GUIDELINE:
Water supplies should be stored in more than one tank or other storage device.
REFERENCES:
1. D2-113070-11, Subsystems Analysis (EC/LSS), for potential hazard of water
contamination.
2. D2-113070-9, Logic Diagram, Propositions 31G and 59B•
REMARKS:
Water is vital to life of the crew and the water supply system should, there-
fore, be designed so that a single failure or contamination of one tan: will
not result in loss of the total water supply. Determination of the number
and sizes of the water tanks to be used should involve consideration of the
logistics resupply requirements. If water tanks are to be exchanged during
resupply, the size of the tanks may dictate additional requirements for the
handling and transfer of the water tanks from the resupply vehicle to the
space station.
Also applies to the following hazard group: 1. Contamination
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